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Abstract
The landscape of security has been changed by the increase in online market places, and
the rapid growth of mobile and wireless networks. Users are now exposed to greater risks
as they interact anonymously in these domains. Despite the existing security paradigms,
trust among users remains a problem. Reputation systems have now gained popularity
because of their effectiveness in providing trusted interactions.
We argue that managing reputation by relying on history alone and/or biased opinions
is inadequate for security, because such an approach exposes the domain to vulnerabilit-
ies. Alternatively, the use of historical, recent and anticipated events supports effective
reputation management.
We investigate how the dynamic data-driven application systems paradigm can aid
reputation management. We suggest the use of the paradigm’s primitives, which in-
cludes the use of controller and simulation components for performing computations and
predictions.
We demonstrate how a dynamic framework can provide effective reputation management
that is not influenced by biased observations. This is an online decision support system
that can enable stakeholders make informed judgments. To highlight the framework’s
usefulness, we report on its predictive performance through an evaluation stage. Our
results indicate that a dynamic data-driven approach can lead to effective reputation
management in trust-reliant domains.
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1Part I
The purest treasure mortal times afford is
spotless reputation; that away,
men are but gilded loam or painted clay.
William Shakespeare
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The expansion of the global computing infrastructure such as the Internet, cloud etc,
has raised new and difficult security challenges, such as anonymous collaboration among
participants and changes in environmental conditions. Likewise, the global infrastructure
is highly dynamic with continuously appearing and disappearing entities, services and
changes in entity behaviour. In response to these challenges, the goals of reputation and
trust management in the infrastructure are to allow collaborating entities reason about the
trustworthiness of each other and to make security decisions on the basis of trust. These
goals require the development of computational reputation and trust models that enable
the entities to reason about trust and verify the security properties of any collaboration
and interaction. For these reasons, it is essential that associated computational models
are able to incorporate effective reputation management into their functionalities [IFI11].
Furthermore, with the increase in the use of the Internet, mobile devices, computers,
3
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online market places, and wireless networks, users are exposed to greater risk as they
collaborate with one another. In order to reduce risk and improve performance (effectiveness
and reliability), applications on the infrastructure must manage trust relationships among
users, by motivating cooperation and honest participation. Introducing trust to such
large-scale distributed applications and domains is a difficult challenge, but one well suited
for reputation and trust management[SAB10].
During the past decade, reputation and trust management has provided cogent answers
to emerging challenges in the global computing infrastructure relating to computer and
network security, electronic commerce, virtual enterprises, social networks and cloud
computing (in terms of trusted communications). It is vital in establishing a healthy
and efficient collaboration among a group of participants and players that might have
insufficient prior knowledge about each other [LS10]. This thesis aims to contribute
to reputation management field by catering for the dynamism in the interactions and
relationships among anonymous users.
1.2 Motivation
Computational reputation and/or trust is central to the use of the global computing
infrastructure, especially in domains that are based on collaboration among members.
Over the years, as these trust-reliant domains have evolved, risky collaboration with
potentially unknown and misbehaving parties has resulted in new attacks. The need to
minimise these risks resulted in the development of several Reputation and Trust-based
Models (RTMs) that have been shown to be useful. Despite the proliferation of the models,
there remain outstanding challenges of prediction, dynamism and susceptibility to attacks
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in the domains. These challenges include: the dynamic nature of reputation and trust,
likely changes in entities’ behaviour over time, dynamics of their interactions, emerging
behaviour resulting from their interactions, new or emerging computing paradigms in global
computing and their security concerns, new or unanticipated attacks, group dynamics and
formulations, etc.
Additionally, behavioural expectation in any context can be motivated from a social
perspective, where individuals within a society are expected to behave in certain ways.
A disreputable person could redeem himself through consistent honest actions over time
whilst a trusted person could become less reputable if they demonstrated deceit over time
[AD05]. This implies that reputation can change randomly over time, and is therefore
dynamic. We refer to this nature as Trust Dynamics in this thesis.
In the RTM research domain, it is usually assumed that the predictive power of a
reputation and trust management model depends on the supposition that past behaviour
is an indication of future behaviour. This premise is not always effective because it results
in attacks on the reputation management system itself [OTB11, OBT12].
This research is motivated by these challenges. In order to enhance trusted communic-
ations among a domain of participants, reputation and trust management models should
provide the essential primitives for reliable reputation and trust management, address trust
dynamics and the making of predictions. Also in response to these challenges, this thesis
proposes and investigates Dynamic Data-Driven Framework for Reputation Management
(D3-FRT), which is a decision support system, that exploits the Dynamic Data-Driven
Application Systems (DDDAS) [DDD06] approach for managing reputation.
6 Introduction
1.3 This Thesis
Over the last decade, RTMs [BLB02, GBS08, MM02, QHC06] have gained popularity over
the years borrowing ideas from both Game Theory and Bayesian networks. These models
are described as systems that provide mechanisms to produce a metric encapsulating
reputation for each identity in any given application domain [HZNR09]. The metric is
subsequently referred to as Reputation Value (RV) in this thesis.
Basically, RTMs aim to provide information that allows members to distinguish between
trustworthy and untrustworthy members. The models encourage the cooperation of domain
members by the provision of incentives and discourage maliciousness by using punishment
schemes such as isolation and service denial [OTB11]. RTMs have been adopted in
applications that rely on members’ cooperation in order for the application to function
correctly. The models have been used extensively in various electronic commerce and
online communities such as YouTube, Amazon and eBay. Some literatures also suggest
their use in domains ranging from Peer-To-Peer (P2P) to mobile networks.
From our study of some of these models, we concluded that whilst they aim to solve
trust related issues in their domains, the models invariably introduce other issues. There
is therefore a need for a framework (presented in this thesis), that is capable of providing
dynamic trust ratings at runtime and predicting the future ratings of entities within a
domain. The framework does not only rely on collective opinion and ratings to determine
the reputation of domain entities. Instead the framework uses its simulation, feedback
and control mechanisms to make predictions about a potential compromise before it
occurs. For these reasons, D3-FRT which is proposed in this thesis, is a proactive decision
support system that provides useful information about domain events to enable the making
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of informed decisions. Therefore providing the necessary primitives for addressing the
challenge of reputation and trust dynamics.
1.4 Research Perspective
Despite recent advances in the state-of-art and practice in areas related to computational
models and frameworks for managing reputation and trust in networks, the problem of
managing trust dynamics, which we explicate in this research, is still an open research
challenge. In particular, this research by and large aims at understanding:
• The problem of trust dynamics. We consider how managing trust dynamics can be
fundamentally different from other assumptions.
• The usefulness of anticipating futuristic events in the prediction of reputation. More
precisely, we analyse the relationship between domain and anticipated events to
identify any correlations.
• The underlying architectural choices, design decisions and primitives which are
necessary for realising such requirements and for engineering frameworks for managing
reputation and trust dynamics. In this context, we argue that the effectiveness of
any dynamic reputation and trust management system is sensitive to the choices of
the underlying architectural style - i.e. whether it is fully distributed, centralised or
a combination of both architectures.
These are studied using relevant scenarios through our proposed and unique semi-
distributed approach for predictive reputation management; a first in its kind. Our novel
framework sought inspirations from the generic DDDAS paradigm and adopts much of its
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underlying primitives. The research aims to understand the extent to which DDDAS and
its primitives can induce new methods for managing reputation and trust dynamics.
1.5 Introductory Example
This section introduces an application that is representative of the class of trust and
reputation-reliant applications that this research targets. In particular, the focus is on the
issues of trust dynamics, and the predictability of trust. The aim of this sub-section is to
highlight these issues and introduce the value of this research to the reputation landscape.
1.5.1 Trust in Traffic Monitoring and Management
Consider a network of mobile sensor nodes that are deployed along the roadside to monitor
vehicular movement in order to obtain real traffic flow data and conditions. The network
runs a reputation and trust management system where the sensors are equipped with
wireless interfaces with which they form the network. The nodes can sense, measure
and gather information from the environment and, based on predetermined or some
local decision process [YMG08], transmit the data to a central control server or network
controller. This information is used by the server for decisions about the nodes and for
traffic control in order to, for example, judge the cause of a road accident, traffic jam or
redirect traffic to other routes.
Collaboration
The effectiveness of the traffic management system is dependent on the expected behaviour
of the nodes. Nodes collaborate to collect and process the data that generate information
about traffic conditions. When a sensor node receives information from another, it is
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combined and fused with local information. The information is sent to all nodes in the
path for the same processing before being sent to the server.
Each node watches the transmission of neighbouring nodes, and then reports any
deviation from expected behaviour and makes recommendations. In a normal situation, if
a sensor node A needs to forward a message M to another node D, it relays the message
to its next hop neigbour B and B forwards the message to C. Node C then relays M to
node D.
Challenges: The nodes are vulnerable to various internal and
external attacks due to their dynamic and volatile nature. An ad-
versary may compromise a sensor node, which in turn compromises
other nodes. It is possible that B colludes with C and does not
report to A when C alters message M to M#, before spreading
the bogus message (collusion attack). Although a message was
delivered to the recipient, the originator is unaware that a wrong
message has been delivered. Therefore, trust decisions to be made
by the controller have been corrupted through recommendations
made by the colluding nodes.
Can nodes be trusted to provide accurate information about domain
events? How can the system quickly and accurately distinguish
misbehaving nodes from trusted nodes? How can misbehaviour be
penalised and how can expected behaviour be effectively encouraged?
How can the system identify colluding nodes that cover-up for one
another?
The trust management system should be designed to be reliable and effective. Reputa-
tion and trust have to be predictable for each entity in the domain. The system should
not rely only on the collective opinion and recommendations of the domain entities in
making trust decisions.
Dynamism
The reputation management system provides a RV representing the reputation of each
wireless sensor node in the network. The nodes are rated according to behaviours they
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exhibit, for example, sending more conflicting information when compared to other
neighbouring nodes results in a negative rating whilst a consistent propagation of correlating
information earns a positive value. After each event in the network, nodes’ trust values
are updated using the rating earned for the event. Past events that resulted in a node’s
current value help the reputation system identify nodes in the network that can be trusted.
Challenges: A node sends accurate information for an extended
period of time in order to earn high ratings and trust value. The
node subsequently suddenly begins to misbehave by propagating
inaccurate information about vehicular movement across the
network (intoxication attack).
Will the provision of recent ratings aid the identification of sudden
behavioural changes? How can the anticipation of misbehaviour
help in preventing this form of attack?
The assumption that past behaviour is an indication of futuristic behaviour is not valid
with sudden behavioural changes and is inadequate in providing a trusted system. Historical
events in the network should have less effect on more recent events when computing the
trust of each member. Sudden changes in node behaviour should be captured and analysed
by the reputation system. If misbehaviour is anticipated using historical, current and
possible future events, such misbehaviours can most likely be prevented.
The example in this section has highlighted the consequences of ill-management of
reputation trust, and therefore, highlighting the need for a new framework that focuses on
the dynamic nature of reputation and trust.
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1.6 Objectives and Contributions
The objective of this thesis is to investigate a novel approach for managing the dynamics
of reputation. The goal is to be able to facilitate dynamic reputation computation,
prediction and provision of useful information for domain stakeholders such as the network
administrator. We aim to suggest solutions to the issue of corruption of trust decisions
by domain entities, also to distinguish between members, penalise misbehaving ones and
provide dynamic reputation management.
This thesis presents a piece of work that can be useful in critical domains such as in
military networks, traffic management systems, and mobile ad-hoc or sensor networks
and so on. Therefore, this thesis contributes a simulation framework for reputation
management. The contribution is sub-divided in the following.
• In DDDAS an application can accept and respond dynamically to new data, and
in reverse, the application can dynamically control itself. In essence, the DDDAS
unifies complex computational models of a system with real-time data acquisition
and aids the controlling of the system. Our research is the first of its use of
the DDDAS paradigm for reputation management. This thesis shows that the
use of monitoring, simulation, and feedback in terms of prediction and control
mechanisms, can potentially improve on the reliability of systems that rely on
reputation management to function.The proposed framework has the capability of
providing a high level of dynamism by updating the ratings of domain members as
the collaborate.
• The general assumption that past histories indicate future events has been found
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not to be effective and reliable. This is because the domain is then exposed to
vulnerabilities such as intoxication.
We present in this thesis, an approach that does not rely on historical data alone
for trust decisions. The approach also considers more recent data and anticipates
possible futuristic events that could occur in the domain.
• In a distributed architecture for reputation and trust management, each participant
maintains the trust information of other participants, whereas in a centralised system,
a trusted entity manages the reputation of all participants. A semi-distributed
reputation management system is more desirable as it combines the advantages of
both distributed and centralised architectures.
When compared to completely distributed reputation and trust-based models, a
semi-distributed predictive framework may have a relatively higher performance
overhead, but is timelier in terms of misbehaviour detection. The semi-distributed
architecture for reputation management that is described here will be most applicable
in niche environments where the security requirement is more critical compared to
other non-functional requirements.
• As it was described earlier in Section 1.5.1, trust decisions that is generated by a
reputation system can be corrupted by relying on domain members. In the approach
suggested in this thesis, decision making is not dependent only on the collective
opinion of domain members, but also based on observations captured by the controller
of domain events within a specific time frame. This form of monitoring and feedback
system prevents collusion attack among domain members. The simulation component
of D3-FRT makes prediction about future events in the system. These predictions
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are not only useful at the network level but at a higher level, providing adequate
and timely information that allows for countermeasures and for enabling the making
of informed and security-aware decisions by stakeholders. The prediction gives
the system enough time for preventive measures, making the framework proactive
compared with some other models. The framework can be proactive in terms of
providing controls such as downgrading the rating of suspect or misbehaving members
before they perpetuate an attack.
1.7 List of Publications
The work presented in this thesis is based on and extends several papers that have been
published in the last three and a half years. The papers include:
[OBT12]: O. Onolaja, R. Bahsoon, and G. Theodoropoulos. Agent-based trust man-
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volume 9, pages 1119-1128, 2012.
[OBT11]: O. Onolaja, R. Bahsoon, and G. Theodoropoulos. Trust Dynamics: A
Data-Driven Simulation Approach. In IFIPTM’11: 5th IFIP WG 11.11 International
Conference on Trust Management of International Federation for Information Processing
(IFIP), volume 358 of Advances in Information and Communication Technology (AICT),
pages 323-334, Springer, 2011.
[OTB11]: O. Onolaja, G. Theodoropoulos, and R. Bahsoon. A Data-Driven Framework
for Dynamic Trust Management. In ICCS’11: Proceedings of the International Conference
on Computational Science in the Journal of Procedia Computer Science, volume 4, pages
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1751-1760, 2011.
[OBT10]: O. Onolaja, R. Bahsoon, and G. Theodoropoulos. Conceptual Framework for
Dynamic Trust Monitoring and Prediction. In ICCS’10: Proceedings of the International
Conference on Computational Science in the Journal of Procedia Computer Science, volume
1, pages 1235-1244, 2010.
[OBT09]: O. Onolaja, R. Bahsoon, and G. Theodoropoulos. An Architecture for
Dynamic Trust Monitoring in Mobile Networks. In OTM’09: 4th International Workshop
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494-503, 2009.
This thesis should be regarded as the definitive account of the work.
1.8 Roadmap of Thesis
This thesis is made up of four parts that are sub-divided into eight chapters. Part I
includes the first two chapters, introduces and gives the background of this thesis. Chapter
1 provides the motivating context and the focus of this thesis. In Chapter 2, the concepts
of reputation, trust and reputation management are introduced. The chapter discusses the
usefulness, objectives and some problems of reputation and trust management systems.
Part II details an overview of reputation and trust-based models and a background of
the DDDAS paradigm. Chapter 3 considers the existing problems of reputation and trust
management and critically reviews literature focused on reputation and trust management
models with proposed solutions to the trust related problems that have shown useful results.
The chapter describes how the existing models attempt to solve the problems; each with its
merits and faults. Comparative and gap analysis of the models are discussed extensively in
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this chapter. Chapter 4 introduces the dynamic data-driven application systems paradigm
and motivates the usefulness of the paradigm for reputation management. The chapter
discusses the DDDAS computational model in the context of examples of novel capabilities
enabled through its implementation in different application areas. In addition, notable
literature that adopts the paradigm is comprehensively described. The chapter elaborates
on the issues of trust dynamics. We also describe how the DDDAS coupled with an
agent-based simulation approach can be useful for the problem of trust dynamics.
In part III, we present the approach adopted in this thesis and an evaluation. Chapter
5 builds on the gaps in the literature that are identified in Chapters 3 and 4. The chapter
introduces the novel framework (D3-FRT) for the predictive reputation management
system that adopts a rich agent-based simulation approach. The chapter describes how
D3-FRT is capable of providing dynamic trust ratings of domain members at runtime and
making predictions. Chapter 6 applies the proposed framework in a network situation
to examine its effectiveness in providing trusted communications among participants.
D3-FRT’s performance in terms of its predictive capability, dynamism, and scalability and
in varying scenarios is evaluated in this chapter.
Part IV summarises this thesis. Chapter 7 presents the overall conclusions based on the
work done, reviews the contributions that this thesis has made and details some promising
directions for future work.
Finally, Appendix A gives the attack modelling on the reputation system as they
have been implemented in this research and in Appendix B, a sample of the data that is
generated by the D3-FRT is presented.
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Chapter 2
The Notion of Reputation and Trust
2.1 Background
The spread of Internet usage, proliferation of mobile devices, computers, and online market
places, as well as the rapid growth of wireless networks and other related domains have
changed the landscape of security. Users are exposed to greater risks as they collaborate
anonymously with one another within diverse domains. The domains rely primarily on
cooperative user behaviour for their effective operations because without this cooperation,
they cannot fulfil their functions.
In order to reduce risks and improve performance, applications must manage trust
relationships between users, by motivating cooperation and honest participation [SAB10].
P2P networks for example have undergone rapid progress and significant developments in
recent years in this regard. However, due to their anonymous and open nature, malicious
users can abuse the system by disseminating bogus files or acting together to commit as
much damage as possible (collusion attack) [OBT12]. For such networks to be effective in
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fulfilling their purpose of anonymous sharing, they should be relatively reliable, efficient and
secure [CLB10]. Moreover, Internet applications have evolved from centralised and private
computing platforms to distributed and collaborative computing systems. Collaboration
is in fact today a fundamental Internet computing requirement.
Reputation and Trust Management is well suited for the requirements and the research is
highly interdisciplinary [LS10], involving researchers from networking and communications:
Mobile Adhoc Networks (MANETs)1, Wireless Sensor Network (WSNs)2 and P2P, data
management and information systems, e-commerce and online communities: YouTube,
Amazon and eBay, Artificial Intelligence, and also the Social Sciences and Evolution
Biology. The concepts of trust and reputation have been developed into Reputation and
Trust-based Models (RTMs). These models have gained popularity because they have
been shown to be promising in the area of reputation and trust management as they aim
to collect, aggregate, and disseminate feedback about a user’s behaviour, based on some
predetermined premise.
Reputation and trust management is useful for establishing healthy and efficient
collaborations among a network of participants and users that might not have sufficient
prior knowledge about each other [LS10]. For example, eBay has several millions of
auctions simultaneously open, serving as a listing service where buyers and sellers assume
all associated risks with transactions [RZFK00]. There are occurrences of fraudulent
transactions however there is a higher rate of successful transactions as well, which are
primarily attributed to the reputation system on eBay called the Feedback Forum. This is
1Infrastructureless networks that have no fixed routers; all nodes are capable of movement and can be
connected dynamically in an arbitrary manner [RCK99]
2These are a large number of densely deployed nodes that mainly use broadcast communication
paradigm to monitor arge or complex physical environments [ASSC02]
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a prime example of a RTM which is getting to be a commonplace in many other domains
as well.
Despite the proliferation of RTMs in the trust-reliant domains, ensuring trusted
collaborations among participants remains a challenge. Several unaddressed threats
(discussed in the later part of this chapter) still limit the effectiveness of reputation
systems.
Furthermore, some of the existing RTMs in literature focus on historical and recent
information in determining the reputation of domain members. However, the dynamic
nature of reputation and trust requires an equally dynamic approach to computing and
resolving trust related issues in any domain.
2.2 Reputation and Trust
The reputation of a node in the survey of Djenouri et al. [DKB05] is the amount of trust
that a trustor grants a trustee regarding the trustee’s cooperation and participation in
the domain. In this thesis, an entity is said to be trusted when it has obtained positive
feedbacks from its interactions with others coupled with high ratings in a domain.
Reputation and trust have been used interchangeably and synonymously in literature.
However, some studies [JIB07, BAS09] indicate that whilst there is some correlation
between them, there is a clear difference between the concepts. An example is given by
Josang et al. in [JIB07] detailing the differences between the concepts as:
1. Trust systems produce a score that reflects the relying party’s subjective view of an
entity’s trustworthiness, whereas reputation systems produce an entity’s reputation
score as seen by all.
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2. Transitivity is an explicit component in trust systems, whereas reputation systems
usually only take transitivity implicitly into account.
3. Trust systems usually take subjective and general measures of trust as input, whereas
information or ratings about specific events, such as transactions, are used as input
in reputation systems.
Furthermore, Momani and Challa in [Mom10] defines trust as a derivation of the
reputation of an entity. In the work, the authors state that based on the reputation, a level
of trust is bestowed upon an entity. By motivating from a social perspective, reputation
is built over time based on a person’s history of behaviour, and determines the level of
trust that is bestowed on the person in a society. Reputation is said to be the amount
of trust inspired by a particular member of a community in a specific domain. These
definitions show the interlink between both concepts (trust and reputation); which is also
the position of this thesis. For simplicity, this thesis describes reputation as the overall
status of an entity within a particular domain and context while an entity is said to be
trusted if it obtains high ratings from its interactions (reputation). Also, we focus on
reputation rather than the subjectivity of trust, the time-dependency of reputation and
direct trust relationships are highlighted in this thesis.
2.2.1 Properties of Reputation and Trust
The general properties of reputation and trust in the work of Liu and Issarny [LI04], and
Adam and Davies in [AD05] are discussed below:
• Subjective: The subjective property of trust implies that an entity in a domain
may have different RVs depending on the individual perception of other entities.
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That is, node A might have a very good reputation as perceived by B, but just an
average reputation with C.
• Context Dependent: Reputation is context dependent because it is possible for
an individual to exhibit contrasting behaviours in different situations. An example
is a domain member that may be a good seller but not a good buyer on an online
auctioning system.
• Time Dependent and Dynamic: From the social perspective, a person’s be-
haviour in a society can fluctuate with time and the person can be classified as
reputable at a certain time but become less reputable at another time. This implies
that trust (and reputation) change over time and are therefore, dynamic and time
dependent.
• Transitive: Transitivity can be described using the example: if a node A trusts B
and B trusts C then A trusts C. There is a conflict about the transitivity of trust
in literature. This is due to the fact that trust can either be treated as subjective or
global. When trust is regarded as subjective, then it is not transitive whereas the
reverse is the case when it is global [BAS09]. In this research, trust is treated as a
global property and is therefore transitive.
2.2.2 Trust Relationships
Trust relationships, which are a major component of reputation management, shows
the connections between participants. They help in capturing the behaviour of domain
members through monitoring, whether cooperative or otherwise as evidence to compute
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their level of trustworthiness and of course, reputation.
According to Srinivasan et al [STW+08], trust relationships can be broadly classified
into:
1. First-hand (direct trust): This is a direct trust relationship that represents a
trust assertion of a member (trustor) about another (trustee). It is a one-to-one trust
relation between both parties. The trust relation is maintained locally by trustors
and represents the trustors’ personal opinion about the trustee [SRIT11]. The system
therefore uses direct observation or its own experience to update reputation. Typical
examples of this are a trust relationship among friends in a social context such as on
Facebook.
2. Second-hand (Recommendation-based trust): This is a third-party’s opinion
about another entity. It can either be a one-to-many or many-to-one relationship. In
this relationship, the system uses information provided by domain members about a
certain participant.
Most systems proposed so far use both first-hand and second-hand information to
update reputation. This allows the system to make use of the experience of its neighbours
to form its opinions. Some systems choose not to use both types of information. In systems
that use only first hand information, a node’s reputation value of another node is not
influenced by others.
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2.3 Reputation and Trust-Based Models
RTMs have been studied, applied and found useful in diverse disciplines such as in Social
Sciences, Economics and Computer Science. In Computer Science, RTMs aim to provide
mechanisms to produce a metric encapsulating reputation (referred to as Reputation Value)
for a given domain for each identity in the system [HZNR09].
These models are essential for establishing a healthy and efficient collaboration among
a network of participants and players that may not have prior knowledge of one another
[LS10]. An illustration can be given from some online auctioning systems that provide a
means of obtaining quality ratings of participants of transactions by having the buyer and
seller give each other feedback.
The main goals of an RTM as identified by Srinivasan et al. in [STW+08] are to:
1. Provide information that allows nodes to distinguish between trustworthy and
non-trustworthy members;
2. Encourage members to be trustworthy by incentivising good behaviour;
3. Discourage the participation of untrusted members;
4. Cope with any kind of observable misbehaviour;
5. Minimise the damage caused by insider attacks.
Furthermore, when designing reputation and trust management systems, the following
properties ([ZH07]) should be considered:
• High accuracy : To help distinguish reputable members from non-reputable ones, the
system should calculate the trust ratings as close to their real trustworthiness as
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possible.
• Adaptability : In domains where, members join and leave dynamically such as in
an open P2P system, the RTM should adapt to these changes rather than being
reactive.
• Scalability : The RTM should be able to scale to serve a large number of members in
term of accuracy, convergence speed, and extra overhead per member.
• Robustness to misbehaviour : The system should be robust to various attacks by
whether from independent domain members or collective.
• Fast convergence: Behaviour changes are expected in dynamic domains causing
reputation to vary over time. Therefore, reputation aggregation should converge fast
enough to reflect the true changes in behaviours.
• Low overhead : The system should only consume limited computation and bandwidth
resources for reputation monitoring and evaluation.
Additionally, RTMs are a very robust solution to curtail insider attacks compared to the
use of cryptography and other solutions. This is because the misbehaving or compromised
nodes are a part of the domain and have access to the cryptographic keys of other
members. However, RTMs also come along with added overhead, both in computation
and communication and add another dimension of security consideration. That is, the fact
that an adversary has another vector: the reputation system itself, to attack the system
with.
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2.3.1 Misbehaviour
Behavioural expectation in any domain can be considered from a social perspective, where
individuals are expected to behave in certain ways within the society. The behaviour of
an individual, whether good or bad, will determine how others will cooperate with the
individual. Using the introductory example in Chapter 1, the expected behaviour of a
sensor node set up for monitoring vehicular movement is expected to be cooperative with
neighbouring sensor nodes in collecting and transmitting honest and observed data.
Misbehaviour is the deviation from the norm, i.e. the expected behaviour in the domain.
Entities that misbehave are said to be untrusted or misbehaving in this thesis. An example
of misbehaviour among nodes in a Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) is packet dropping
where a malicious node selectively drops packets that should be forwarded. Similarly,
malicious peers in a file sharing P2P network may change or forge files, resulting in lack of
integrity for the files in the networks; this is referred to as modification.
Misbehaviour can either be selfish or malicious. Nodes may for example selfishly save
battery power or memory by not forwarding packets that are of interest in a network.
However, malicious misbehaviour tends to maximise damage to the system even at the cost
of the nodes benefit themselves. Hence, the only remedy for such members is exclusion
from the domain [STW+08].
Furthermore, misbehaving members can employ different strategies, like brain washing,
collusion, intoxication and identity spoofing in influencing their reputation.
• Brain washing depicted in Figure 2.1, is described as when colluding lying nodes
surround a node A for example, and the node is tricked into believing false information.
When the node moves into a different neighbourhood with honest nodes, it will not
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Figure 2.1: Brainwashing (U-untrusted, T-trusted)
believe them since their information deviates too much from its own. This is a form
of collaborative attack because it takes two or more nodes to collude in order to
brainwash another.
• A node may try to gain trust from others by behaving as expected over a sustained
period of time and at a later time (when it has built a good reputation) it starts to
misbehave as shown in Figure 2.2; this is referred to as intoxication. An example is
with an online auctioning system with incidents such as buyers building a high rating
with low-valued transactions and then suddenly misbehaving with a high-valued one.
Figure 2.2: Node behaves as expected for some time to build a good reputation and
suddenly begins to misbehave, such that the reputation fails to detect the node
• Identity spoofing in Figure 2.3 can occur in a network where there is no Identity
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Persistence (IP) and allowing a badly rated node the chance to disappear and
reappear with a different identity [AEKHES08, STW+08].
The existing RTMs fuse data from multiple sources in order to produce meaningful
results for the end user. There is a reliance on domain members to provide accurate
information in the models. An example of the problem that arises from the reliance on such
recommendations is collusion, where two or more members team up to behave maliciously.
Without countermeasures, the effects of this attack have been shown to dramatically affect
the network performance as evidenced in poor reliability and quality of service, higher
overhead and throughput degradation [BLB02, GBS08, LJT04]
Figure 2.3: The node returns with a different identity and is allowed to collaborate.
2.3.2 Reputation System Architectures
There are two main types of RTM architectures, the centralised and distributed architec-
tures. In centralised architectures, trust is managed by a trusted central server(s) (Trusted
Third Party (TTP) also referred to as controller in this thesis) that is connected to all or
some of the identities in the system. The centralised architecture has been successfully
deployed in real life applications such as eBay and Amazon. On eBay’s feedback forum
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[eBa12] that is managed centrally for example, buyers and sellers can rate each other after
each transaction. Members receive: +1 point for each positive rating, 0 points for each
average rating, −1 point for each negative rating. The overall reputation of each entity
is the sum of these ratings over a couple of months. The RTM uses a positive feedback
percentage to rate members, which is:
Positives
Positives+Negatives
∗ 100 (2.1)
where Positives are the number of positive feedbacks within 12 calendar months and vice
versa for Negatives.
This simple reputation management has drawbacks because the approach used is
linear. This implies that a rater gives either positive or negative scores per transaction,
therefore, failing to capture the dynamic nature of reputation effectively. Also generally,
the downsides of centralised architecture are the performance bottleneck of the central
entity and the resulting lack of scalability. However, many e-commerce deployments of
RTMs such as eBay have successfully utilised centralised systems which allow for long-term
storage and better internal auditing of all reputation data [HZNR09].
Contrarily, a purely distributed approach requires each entity or domain member to
maintain trust-related information about other nodes in the system. This indicates that
the reputation management is determined, spread and shared among the nodes. This
approach introduces the additional requirement of obtaining and propagating information
across the system. In this member or node-centric architecture, each node monitors,
analyses and computes the trustworthiness of other nodes of interest, based on some
pre-defined metric(s). However, the low computational power of certain mobile device for
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example, does not allow for such analysis. Also, a purely distributed approach results in
some real-life problems, such as the corruption of trust decisions through recommendations
made by nodes. This approach exposes the system to false praise/accusation and collusion
attack and can be considered as biased. These vulnerabilities are attributed to existing
RTMs lacking well analysed approaches to determining the bias of each node [BVLT07].
The use of a distributed architecture is an issue because the correct functioning of the
system relies on the cooperation of domain members in terms of good behaviour, which
cannot always be guaranteed.
There is also a semi-distributed approach (described in more details in Section 3.10)
which is a combination of centralised and distributed architectures. This approach
recognises the need for a distributed architecture but with a form of control to aid
reputation management. The semi-distributed approach is adopted in this research where
a domain member collaborates in a distributed manner with its reputation not being
entirely determined and managed by other possibly biased members, but by a TTP or
other entities (this is similar to the architecture of hierarchical intrusion detection systems
in [RMK08]).
The ultimate aim of any RTM is to achieve trusted communications among a group
of collaborating members by meeting the domain requirements. The downsides of purely
distributed and centralised systems make a semi-distributed approach more desirable,
as it combines the upsides of both types of architecture. The presence of a TTP in a
semi-distributed architecture for trust management is therefore more appropriate allowing
for collaboration and at the same time providing unbiased monitoring and feedback in the
system, and resulting in a better reputation management.
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2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the notions of trust and reputation have been introduced. We discussed
how RTMs have been found useful in domains that rely on the cooperation of a network of
participants. The models aid the collaboration required and the effectiveness of trust-reliant
domains.
The use of reputation and trust management however, introduces an additional overhead,
giving an adversary a vector to attack the system which is the reputation system itself.
Intoxication, collusion, brainwashing, identity spoofing are some of the attacks that
the models are exposed to. Without countermeasures, the effects of these attacks have
been shown to dramatically affect the security and performance at runtime [BLB02]
as evidenced in poor reliability and quality of service, higher overhead and throughput
degradation. In order to address the problems of intoxication and collusion attack in
reputation management, this thesis proposes a novel semi-distributed, predictive and
dynamic data-driven framework that is described in Chapter 5.
2.4 Summary 31
Part II
That men do not learn very much from
the lessons of history is the most important
of all the lessons of history.
Aldous Huxley
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Chapter 3
Computational Reputation and
Trust Models
3.1 Introduction
Generally, RTMs [BVLT07, BLB02, CWHG08, GBS08, HWK04, MM02, QHC06] provide
the mechanism to monitor, gather the behaviour of members in a network and compute
reputations of nodes based on the information obtained by monitoring. They also coordinate
approaches to storing and exchanging of reputation information among nodes within the
domain. RTMs are described as systems that provide mechanisms to produce RVs or trust
ratings for each identity in the domain. Generally, RTMs aim to provide information to
distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy members. As stated in Chapter 1,
the trust models encourage members to cooperate by providing incentives and discourage
maliciousness by punishment schemes such as isolation and service denial.
Normally, RTMs rely on recommendations provided by entities in the domain to
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determine the reputation of others. Each model addresses some of the trust issues but
not all of the problems or in the process of solving one issue, other issues are introduced.
An example of the problems that arise from the reliance on these recommendations is
collusion. Incentive policies that are used in P2P networks to ensure cooperation between
peers are also generally susceptible to collusion attack [LZY+07].
In this section, a comparative literature review is conducted on models that have
contributed to reputation and trust management in literature and give insights to developing
the framework proposed in this thesis. Researchers proposed trust models to solve trust
related issues and they have shown positive results. Foundational distributed frameworks
were already based on social trust considerations, in that they evolved trust based on first-
hand experiences and recommendations, and they integrated some trust properties: context,
subjectivity, and (only later) time. The general concept of trust in Computer Science was
proposed by Marsh [Mar94]. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [ARH00] later proposed the use of
recommendations for managing context-dependent and subjective trust, based on Marsh’s
approach [Que09]. Their model is based on a word-of-mouth mechanism, which allows
agents to decide which other agents’ opinion they trust more. They use direct and indirect
(recommendations) trust and they introduced the semantic distance of the ratings in their
model [Mom10].This work was foundational but was architectural in style and for example
lacked a process for trust evolution [QHC06]. A notable literature by Riegelsberger et
al [RSM05], although targeted at the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) community
suggests basic requirements in designing a trust system. We will not go into reviewing
these papers as the scope of our work is on the infrastructure level. However, 3 of the
requirements stated by Riegelsberger et al that are relevant to our work include: stable
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identity, which we refer to as identity persistence in this thesis, traceability accountability,
that involves the capability of tracing outcomes from actions, group membership and
group identity.
We are specifically searching for the way design decisions are made in infrastructure
related models. The design decisions include: 1) susceptibility to collusion, 2) predictive
capability, and 3) architecture of the system which serves as the taxonomy for comparison.
A number of literature have focused on the problem collusion and one that is noteworthy
amongst them is the work of Liu and Issarny [LI04]; they proposed a (reputation-based)
trust framework that is robust to both defamation and collusion attacks. [MM02, KSGM03,
BLB02] are some other models that are susceptible to the attack as a result of the inherent
properties of their approach and assumptions in their work. In terms of prediction,
there are only a few literatures on trust management that focus on predictive accuracy.
Prominent amongst them is the lightweight distributed trust propagation [Que09] that
shows high predictive accuracy on a large real-world dataset, and, in contrast to existing
approaches, it is fully decentralised. Other relevant work on reputation predictions include:
[HCH08, LC10]. The architecture of trust models determines how information can be
gathered, processed and disseminated in the domain; these and related literatures are
discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11.3 of this chapter.
The selection of the RTMs in subsequent sections is based on the objective that
each system is applicable in a one unique network domain and/or work that has been
built on by other research. The architectural design is another factor that was put
into consideration for our selection. Each system is chosen to provide insights into the
assortment of reputation and trust management applications and to show the adaptation
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of the components of reputation management systems. The models reviewed are those
that are infrastructure based with the following design decisions and issues: Information
gathering, Monitoring, Information representation, Recommendations and Information
sharing, Scalability, Prediction & Dynamism, and Reputation metric. These serve as
criteria for comparison between the RTMs; the extent to which the systems meets or fails
to meet each criterion is discussed.
Additionally, this chapter describes the problem of the corruption of trust decisions
resulting from recommendations made by members with interest in the domain. A gap
analysis of pending problems and comparative analysis are given and these serve as the
motivation of this research.
3.2 Node Cooperation Enforcement
3.2.1 Collaborative Reputation Mechanism to Enforce Node
Cooperation
In the COllaborative REputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation (CORE) [MM02],
reputation is formed and updated with time through direct observations and information
provided by network nodes. Nodes have to contribute continuously to the community to
remain trusted or their reputation will be degraded until they are eventually excluded.
Each node monitors the behaviour of its neighbours with respect to a particular
function, observing the execution of the function. These observations are recorded on
a Reputation Table (RT) stored by every node. The table contains a list of Reputation
Values (RVs) (referred to as reputation values in this research) representing the behaviour
of each node in specific functions and a global RT is used to combine the RVs.
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CORE suggests the use of subjective, indirect and functional reputation types. The
subjective reputation [−1, 1] refers to the reputation calculated directly through a neigh-
bouring node’s observation. Indirect reputation is influenced by information from other
members in the network and the functional reputation is the combination of both subjective
and indirect reputation with respect to an evaluation/observation criteria.
Pros
• Only positive information is shared in the CORE protocol, therefore preventing the
distribution of false negative information about other entities.
• CORE determines the overall reputation of a specific node by considering its reputa-
tion in different functions.
Cons
• CORE suffers from collusion attack where misbehaving malicious nodes extend each
other’s survival time through false praise reports;
• This model unifies the reputation of a node for various functions such as packet
forwarding function and routing function into a global reputation value. This
approach may not be effective as it allows a malicious node to cover its misbehaviour
with respect to one function by being well behaved in others [STW+08].
• The CORE mechanism can only enforce cooperation effectively in non-mobile net-
works [CN06]. It is ineffective in a dynamic network or with high mobility because
the watchdog requires a node to have information about its neighbourhood that may
not be available to the node.
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3.2.2 Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness in Dynamic Ad-Hoc
Networks
Each node maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about every other node of interest
in the Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness in Dynamic Ad-Hoc NeTworks (CONFIDANT)
[BLB02] protocol. The reputation rating represents the opinion formed by a trustor
about a trustee in the base system (such as the ad-hoc network) while the trust rating
represents a node’s opinion about the honesty of another node. Nodes monitor and detect
misbehaviour in their neighbourhood by means of an enhanced packet acknowledgment
(PACK) mechanism where confirmation of acknowledgment comes indirectly by overhearing
the next node’s transmissions.
A cooperation factor which is the frequency of misbehaviour relative to the cumulative
activity of a node is used. Every node i keeps a cooperation factor (Rij) of every other
node j. This factor is expressed as a function of the number of misbehaviours and expected
behaviours. Second-hand recommendations from other nodes are accepted only if they are
compatible, thus reducing the impact of false accusations.
Pros
• Only recent observations are propagated and more weight is given to these than past
observations. This prevents the possibility of a node obtaining a good reputation
initially and then misbehaving.
Cons
• There is heavy reliance on information provided by other nodes, making it difficult
to detect problems when there is a collusion among nodes.
• Only negative information is propagated in the model resulting in false accusation
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vulnerability. This makes it simple for a misbehaving node to distribute false
information about other nodes, in order to initiate a denial of service attack. Also, a
malicious node will realise it has been discovered and change its attack strategy as a
result of the propagated information.
• CONFIDANT does not take into account the context in order to determine the
overall trust and reputation of network members.
• The model assumes that nodes are authenticated and no node can pretend to be
another in order to get rid of a bad reputation.
• Nodes that are excluded from the network recover after a certain period and this gives
malicious nodes the opportunity to resume attack unless revoked after a threshold
of re-entrance. This model allows malicious nodes to redeem themselves quickly
[AD05, STW+08].
3.3 Incentive Based Scheme
In another related study, Secure and Objective-Reputation based Incentive (SORI)
[HWK04] scheme, a promiscuous mode of operation is assumed where a node overhears
the transmissions of its neighbours (even if the packet is not intended for the node) and
maintains a neighbour list. Each node keeps counters of the number of packets requested for
forwarding and those actually forwarded, and a reputation rating is calculated from these
counts along with the derived confidence metric [BLB05]. The confidence metric relies
on two parameters: Request-for-Forwarding (RFN(X)) and Has-Forwarded (HFN(X)).
The RFN(X) indicates the total number of packets that node N has transmitted to X
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for forwarding and HFN(X) corresponds to the total number of packets that has been
forwarded by X and noticed by N .
Given RFN(X) and HFN(X), node N creates a local evaluation record denoted by
LERN(X), which contains a confidence metric that is used to depict how confident N is
for its judgement on the reputation of X. LERN(X) consists of two entries, GN(X) and
CN(X), where GN(X) =
RFN (X)
HFN (X)
and CN(X) = RFN(X).
An incentive scheme is proposed to stimulate packet forwarding, consisting of neigh-
bour monitoring, reputation propagation and punishment. Neighbour monitoring is the
collection information about misbehaviour of neighbours and objective quantification of
the neighbours” reputation while reputation propagation is aimed at sharing information
among neighbouring nodes. Punishment encourages packet forwarding and disciplines
selfish nodes.
Pros
• The propagation of reputation is secured by a one-way hash function which makes it
difficult for a selfish node with a bad reputation to send packets or fake broadcast
information to influence its reputation by impersonating a trusted node.
Cons
• This approach assumes that nodes are not malicious and there is no conspiracy
amongst nodes.
• Each node operates in promiscuous mode and even listens to packets not intended
for the node.
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3.4 TrustGuard
A study by Srivatsa et al. in [SXL05, SL06] uses a strategic oscillation guard based on a
Proportional-Integral-Derivative controller to combat malicious oscillatory behaviour:
TVn(t) = α ∗Rn(t) + β ∗ 1
t
∗
∫ t
0
Rn(x)dx+ γ ∗R′n(t) (3.1)
Rn(t) denotes the rating of a node n at time t and this value can simply be an average
of ratings over a recent time period. R
′
n(t) denotes the derivative of Rn(x) at x = t. α, β
and γ are weightings of the three components. TVn(t), the dependable rating of n at time
t is computed using the equation 3.1 above.
A large value for α biases the rating of node n to recent observations and that of β gives
a higher weight to past behaviour. A lager value of γ amplifies sudden changes in behaviour
of the node (as indicated by the derivative of the rating). The strategic oscillation guard
takes as input, the raw reputation values computed from some other reputation system
and formulates the output value as the sum of three weighted components:
1. The first component is a node’s current performance and is the raw ratings as
computed by the underlying reputation system.
2. The second component is the past history of a node’s actions formulated as the
integral of the function representing all prior reputation values divided by the current
point in time.
3. The third component reflects sudden changes in a node’s performance and is formu-
lated by the derivative of the above mentioned function.
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The averaging nature of the proportional and integral components enables the model to
tolerate errors in raw ratings and reflect consistent node behaviour [SXL05].
Pros
• TrustGuard allows for flexibility by giving different trust components varying weights.
• In order to efficiently store and calculate the historical components specified by the
strategic oscillation guard’s formulation, the concept of fading memories is used.
Instead of storing all previous values, TrustGuard represents the values by using
only log2t values, where t represents system time intervals, with exponentially more
details stored about recent events. This technique allows the strategic oscillation
guard calculations to be deterministically performed with an efficiency of O(logt)
instead of O(t) [HZNR09].
• The system can be implemented with different degrees of centralisation and can also
be fully distributed.
Cons
• A Trusted Third Party (TTP) is included in TrustGuard’s architecture, which could
become a performance bottleneck and a single point of failure. The TTP does not
become a bottleneck with up to 1024 nodes in the system.
• An assumption in TrustGuard is that the framework is built on top of a secure
overlay network which is not always the case.
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3.5 Secure MANET Routing with Trust Intrigue
Capturing evidence of nodes’ behaviour in a more efficient manner that eliminates the
recommender’s bias (the recommender is the observing network member) was the focus of
Secure MANET Routing with Trust Intrigue [BVLT07] (SMRTI). Evidence of trustwor-
thiness is captured from a broad perspective including direct interaction with neighbours,
observing interaction of neighbours and through recommendations.
SMRTI obtains evidence from direct interactions with neighbours in order to identify
their benign and malicious behaviours. The evidence captured from recommendations is
used to predict whether a node is misbehaving or not. It is claimed that the model is able
to address attacks they named: honest-elicitation and free-riding because nodes do not
exchange ratings for recommendation. A malicious node may exhibit honest-elicitation by
forwarding high recommendations for colluding malicious nodes. When a node accepts
recommendations from other nodes, but fails to reciprocate with recommendations when
requested by them, then the node is subject to free-riding.
There is no additional overhead incurred from communicating recommendations but
collusion attack is possible in SMRTI because there is reliance on the opinion of domain
members to maintain the reputation system.
3.6 High Integrity Networks Framework
Each node maintains reputation metrics that represents past behaviour of other nodes in
the Reputation-Based Framework for High Integrity Sensor Networks (RFSN) framework
by Ganeriwal et al. [GBS08]. RSFN clearly differentiates the difference between reputation
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and trust which is similar to the definitions of both terms as given in Chapter 2. The
metrics are used as an inherent aspect in predicting future events. RFSN is very similar to
CORE and CONFIDANT except for its applicability to sensor networks and the presence
of a middleware service that can counter faulty misbehaviour of nodes.
Figure 3.1: Architectural design of RFSN
As depicted in Figure 3.1, RFSN has two key building blocks, watchdog and reputation
and direction of the arrows in the figure represent the flow of information. Each node has
a watchdog component and maintains the RV of other nodes. There is a rating specifying
the level of confidence associated with every observation made by the watchdog. This
rating is any real number between [0, 1]. The reputation block manages the reputation
representation, updates, integrates and ages reputation and also creates a trust metric
output.
Pros
• RFSN offers real-time feedback on the behaviour of members. Only positive reputa-
tion information is propagated, as in CORE [MM02].
Cons
• Since nodes are used to validate each other, RFSN gives room for attacks like
collusion, brainwashing, false praise and false accusation.
3.7 EigenTrust Algorithm 45
• The assumption that the watchdog mechanism will be present on all nodes is not
feasible in real life networks.
• Packet loss influences the performance of a reputation system. In RFSN, it is
assumed that there is no packet loss in the communication channel. This is a costly
assumption in the applications of RFSN, because when there is a heavy load on the
network for example, packet loss is inevitable.
• The model does not provide authentication and confidentiality for the readings made
by the watchdog.
3.7 EigenTrust Algorithm
EigenTrust [KSGM03] was motivated from the need to decrease the number of downloads
of inauthentic files in a P2P file-sharing network. The global reputation of each peer i is
given by the local values assigned to i by other peers, weighted by the global reputation
of the assigning peers. The final rating (which ranges between 0 and 1) for each peer j
is computed by peer i initially computing a normalised local rating cij for j based on i’s
direct observations. Peer i then computes a value for k, by asking other peers, j, for their
opinions of peer k. These opinions are weighted by i’s opinion of j: tik =
∑
j cijcjk, where
tik represents the trust that peer i places in peer k based on response from other peers.
Writing this in matrix notation, let C be the matrix [cij ] and
−→
ti to be a vector containing
the values tik, then the global rating is
−→
ti = C
T−→ci .
Pros
• There is minimal overhead in terms of message complexity. The problem of sudden
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behavioural changes is considered in this model.
Cons
• Collusion is possible in this model due to the reliance on domain members for
maintaining the system.
• EigenTrust assumes that there are pre-trusted nodes in the system. This assumption
is not always true.
• The algorithm does not consider effects of changes in behaviour over time.
• Using the normalised ratings does not differentiate between a peer that peer i did
not collaborate with or another that is had a poor experience with.
3.8 Online Markets
The growth of online markets has led to the need for reducing the uncertainty of engaging
in transactions with anonymous parties. In the computing overall score, eBay for example
merely subtracts negatives from positives despite negatives being much rarer and hence
more informative. In addition, there is no difference in buying from selling behaviour,
just an overall reputation score [eBa12]. For example, a very high feedback score may
not indicate that someone is a good seller if most of their positive feedback comes from
buying, rather than selling activity.
Amazon calculates seller feedback scores using a (1(worst) − 5(best)) star system
[Ama12]. Feedback percentage is calculated using the average of positive, negative and
neutral feedbacks left in the last 30, 90, 365 days, and lifetime, which is similar to the
positive feedback rating used on eBay.
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In these online communities, feedback is overwhelmingly positive and the systems do
not predict performance. A similar example is the discrimination against a seller where
someone who wants to falsely accuse a seller for example, gets his/her friends to purchase
from the seller, and then rate the seller badly and also the reverse by promoting the seller
to boost ratings. In addition to being linear and not capturing trust dynamics, these
RTMs assume that past performance is an indication of future performance, which is not
always true as illustrated in the intoxication attack described in Section 2.3.1.
3.9 Comparative Analysis
The components of RTMs are described in detail in this section, serving as criteria for
comparison between the models discussed earlier and the extent to which each model
meets or fails to meet each criterion.
3.9.1 Information Gathering
This feature of RTMs is the process by which an entity in a domain gathers information
about other entities of interest. This can either be through first-hand or second-hand
information gathering based on a direct observation, experience or recommendation. There-
fore, an entity gathers information either through direct interaction with its neighbours,
by direct observation of its neighbour’s interaction with other domain entities, or by
recommendations made by other entities of interest.
Only CONFIDANT and CORE have made the distinction between first and second-
hand information gathering. CONFIDANT refers to this as personal experience and direct
observation while CORE uses subjective and indirect reputation respectively. Similarly,
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SORI relies on direct observations through neighbour monitoring and SMTRI includes first
and second-hand information recommendations from other members. TrustGuard collects
feedback about nodes through the overlay protocol and this is aggregated to a rating. In
EigenTrust, each peer i is assigned a unique global rating that reflects the experiences of
all peers with i, also on eBay, feedback from direct observations are used.
Relying on information from others as opposed to first-hand observations has been
shown in [BLB03] to offer no gain in reputation accuracy and also introduces additional
vulnerabilities by creating a spiral of self-reinforcing information.
3.9.2 Monitoring
The monitoring function is the approach used to observe events that occur in the domain.
The models [MM02, BLB02, HWK04, BVLT07, GBS08] rely on a watchdog mechanism,
a promiscuous mode of monitoring where each node eavesdrops on the transmission of its
immediate neighbours. By promiscuous monitoring, we mean that each entity overhears
the transmission of neighbours to detect misbehaviour. The mechanism requires that every
entity reports to the originator about the next entity. Once misbehaviour is detected,
a negative rating is stored. The mechanism which is on every node collects first-hand
observations about other nodes of interest.
The assumption that the watchdog mechanism will be present on all nodes is not
feasible in real life networks. This is because nodes will require a considerable amount of
energy in overhearing another node’s transmission. In the WSNs community, privacy of
individual nodes is emphasised making the approach unsuitable for such networks. The
detection mechanism also has a weakness of failing to detect a misbehaving device in case
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of collusion.
In TrustGuard model, monitoring is dependent on the overlay protocol and monitoring
in EigenTrust, and on eBay it is through the direct observation of a peer from other peers.
The EigenTrust algorithm relies on the notion of transitive trust where a peer i will have
a high opinion of peers that have provided it authentic files in a file sharing P2P. Peer i
also trusts the opinion of those peers [HZNR09].
Table 3.1: Summary table of reputation and trust models
Criteriaa [MM02] [BLB02] [HWK04] [SXL05] [BVLT07] [GBS08] [KSGM03] eBay
1 First and
second-
hand
informa-
tion from
neigh-
bouring
nodes
First and
second-
hand
informa-
tion from
neigh-
bouring
nodes
Direct ob-
servations
Feedback
from
overlay
protocol
First and
second-
hand in-
formation,
recom-
mended
reputation
Integration
of dir-
ect and
second
hand ob-
servations
First and
second-
hand
observa-
tions
First-hand
experience
2 Watchdog PACK,
Watchdog
Watchdog
like
Depends
on overlay
protocol
Watchdog
like
Watchdog - -
3 Reputation
table with
each entry
repres-
enting a
function
Bayesian
approacha
Counters Unspecified Reputation
ratings
from cap-
tured
evidence
Bayesian
formula-
tionb
Normalising
and ag-
gregating
of ratings
Summation
of ratings
4 Positive Negative Positive
and neg-
ative
recom-
menda-
tions
Unspecified Positive
and neg-
ative
recom-
menda-
tions
Positive
and neg-
ative
recom-
menda-
tions
Positive
and neg-
ative
recom-
menda-
tions
Positive
and neg-
ative
recom-
menda-
tions
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.1 – Continued
Criteriaa [MM02] [BLB02] [HWK04] [SXL05] [BVLT07] [GBS08] [KSGM03] eBay
5 - Performs
well in the
presence
of high
propor-
tion of
malicious
nodes
Higher
overhead
as a result
of increase
in misbe-
haviour
- - Depends
on the
presence
of trusted
node along
required
path of
communic-
ation
- Tier-
partitioning,
horizontal
scaling
6 Ratings
are not
constant,
fading
till a null
value
Periodically
updated
(unspe-
cified)
- Feedbacks
after trans-
action
comple-
tion and
rating is
aggregated
only when
required
Reaction
component
predicts
node beha-
viour and
ratings
continuous
real values
Provides
real time
feedback
Unspecified -
7 Weighted
average
of ratings
ranging
from [-1,1]
(determin-
istic and
continuous
metrics)
Cooperation
factor con-
sisting of
frequency
of misbe-
haviour in
relation
to cu-
mulative
activity
Local
record
from the
number
of packet
forwarded
to and
number
forwarded
by entity
Binary rat-
ings
Continuous
real values
[-1, +1]
Probabilistic
distribu-
tion
Continuous
metrics
conver-
ted into
binary
metrics
via heur-
istics or
statistical
measures
Computed
sum of
feedbacks
(+1, 0, -1),
discrete
values
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aKey: 1. Information gathering, 2. Monitoring, 3. Information representation, 4. Recommendations and information
sharing, 5. Scalability, 6. Prediction & Dynamism, 7. Reputation metric
bBaye’s formula states how a conditional probability depends on its inverse. Let P (a) be the probability that event a will
occur. Also let P (a|b) be the probability of a conditional on b, Bayes formula then states that P (a|b) = P (b|a)P (a)/P (b). In
a Bayesian network, unknown posterior probability is determined given a prior probability. That is, probability is updated
given new information. If the prior probability is unknown, then recommendations are solicited to determine the posterior
probability [HH07]. In [BLB02], the posterior probabilities of a node behaving in a good or bad manner and communicating
correct or incorrect recommendations are computed from the prior probabilities by using Bayes formula.
c[GBS08] used a similar Bayesian formulation as Buchegger and Boudec in [BLB02].
3.9.3 Information Representation
This component of RTMs determines how information obtained about each node is
converted to reputation ratings. Information representation deals with translating captured
evidence meaningfully into a metric and how past and recent information affect the overall
reputation of a node [BLB05, STW+08].
A global reputation value is calculated in CORE by taking into account different
observations or evaluation criteria such as packet forwarding or routing functions. The
downside to the global reputation value is that a node may misbehave in certain functions
and cover up by behaving as expected in other functions in order to gain a good global
reputation. In the CONFIDANT protocol, a weighting scheme where nodes trust their
own experiences and observations more than those of others is used. The rating is only
changed when there is sufficient evidence of malicious behaviour and is changed according
to a rate function namely: the greatest weight for own experience, a smaller weight from
neighbours and the smallest weight for reported experience. CONFIDANT and RFSN
both give a higher weight to past behaviour than recent behaviour in order to discourage
intoxication.
SORI targets the non-forwarding misbehaviour and keeps count of packets forwarded
by each node. The reputation rating consists of the ratio of these counts, taking into
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account the confidence in the rating proportional to the number of packets requested for
forwarding. The first-hand and second hand information in RFSN are combined to get
the reputation value of a node. The reputation of a node determines its rating which falls
in the range of 0 and 1. In SMTRI, captured evidence is quantified and represented as
reputation ratings. The quantified evidence is then represented as direct, observed, and
recommended reputation ratings. Reputation is represented by continuous real values [-1,
+1] in this model. SMTRI lays emphasis on context and events in determining ratings and
this approach largely reduces its susceptibility to intoxication attacks.
Computation of trust in TrustGuard can be done using any existing trust evaluation
mechanism. However in EigenTrust, each peer has a unique global rating assigned by
other peers, weighted by the global ratings of the assigning peers. On eBay, participants
rate each other in each transaction and the overall reputation is the sum of the ratings
over a certain period of time.
3.9.4 Information Sharing
This component of RTMs is the way reputation information is propagated in the network to
enable members decide whether to cooperate with others. Information that is propagated
can either be negative, positive or both.
SORI proposes the use of a secure one-way hash function which makes it difficult for a
selfish node with a bad reputation to send out its packets or broadcast fake observation
information to affect the calculation of others. Only negative information is propagated
in the CONFIDANT protocol, which prevents false praise attacks but results in false
accusation vulnerability.
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In CORE, only positive information is shared and the downside to this is false-praise
vulnerability in the system. Similarly, only direct and positive reputation is propagated in
RFSN and this results in an increase in memory overhead due to the need of maintaining
a separate data structure for direct reputation [STW+08]. Propagation of information
in TrustGuard is dependent on the underlying overlay network while on eBay both
positive and negative feedbacks are considered. EigenTrust uses a deterministic distributed
dissemination framework relying on Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) for rating storage and
lookup. The efficiency of the dissemination corresponds to the efficiency of the underlying
DHT in performing lookups, which is typically O(logn).
3.9.5 Scalability
Scalability in this research refers to performance of an RTM with dynamic updates and
feedback relative to the topology and/or number of misbehaving and normal members in
the system. It is not evident to what extent some RTMs such as [MM02, SXL05, BVLT07,
KSGM03] are scalable. However, the CONFIDANT protocol is scalable in terms of the
total number of nodes in the network and performs well with a high proportion (60%) of
malicious nodes. The overhead in the SORI scheme increases as number of connections
increases, this is due to a higher probability of collision in the network leading to reputation
miscalculation and hence, a larger overhead.
RFSN runs on each node and functions in a distributed manner, making it unfeasible
for node to maintain the reputation of all nodes. It is worth noting that the assumption is
that the subset of nodes with which a node interacts remains almost the same throughout
the network lifetime. This makes RFSN relatively scalable. Not only is it sufficient for
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nodes to maintain reputation for only a few nodes, they can establish these metrics though
simple local interactions [GS04]. In order to interact with distant nodes, a node can use a
chain of trusted nodes to communicate. However, level of scalability RFSN provides is
dependent on the presence of trusted nodes along the required path, a requirement which
cannot always be guaranteed.
The resource usage on online communities should increase linearly (or better) with
load (where load may be measured in user traffic, data volume, etc). With hundreds of
millions of users worldwide, billions of page views a day, and petrabytes of data on such
platforms, scalability is essential. Scalability in Amazon is handled by a fully distributed
and decentralised services platform, serving many different applications. The reputation
system on eBay is based on a centralised architecture with expected scalability problems
such as overloading, availability etc. However, partitioning is used in every tier (code level,
application and database) of eBay’s architecture, dividing the workload into manageable
units. In addition, horizontal scaling is present at every tier, therefore scaling out and not
up [O’H06].
3.9.6 Prediction and Dynamism
The prediction property of RTMs is necessary to anticipate RVs of domain members.
Likely future behaviours can be anticipated by considering historical data available and
recent behaviour through a learning process. The dynamic property is in terms of the
provision of current ratings by the models and feedback for decisions to be made in the
system. These features help in making informed and security aware decisions, such as
exclusion of misbehaving members from the domain or avoiding malicious members by
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others that need to collaborate.
The focus of models discussed here is not to carry out prediction except for RFSN
that offers a form of prediction and real time feedback. In RFSN, the authors argue that
reputation can only be used to statistically predict the future behaviour of other nodes
and it cannot deterministically define the action performed by them.
3.10 Semi-Distributed Models with Trusted Third
Party components
In order to manage trust, some reputation systems rely on a TTP in their architecture.
In these literatures [BZ04, BZ05, LLYT05, GB07, SL06], the authors claim that they are
distributed system. However due to the presence of the TTP, in this thesis, the models
are regarded as semi-distributed models in this thesis.
The reputation management scheme proposed by Bamasak and Zhang [BZ04, BZ05]
makes use of a TTP to assist agents in signature generation and to store evidences for the
non-repudiation of signature receipt service provision. The focus of this research is on the
evaluation of the trustworthiness and selection of a TTP to ensure the level security that
conventional security solutions and cryptographic methods can not sufficiently provide.
The reputation management scheme approach is unlike other RTMs that focus on how
domain members join, are penalised or rewarded and their interaction patterns. The
model credits and penalises a TTP-host according to its transactional behaviour, the
transaction value and the reputation of the source of the feedback. The authors claim
that this approach will deter TTP-host from misbehaving. A TTP’s host reputation is in
terms of a trust level and a reliability level, both of which are aggregated over a specific
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past period. This implies that the host may behave as expected for a lengthy period of
time in order to become a TTP-host, and then later misbehave resulting in intoxication
attack on the system.
A framework is proposed by [LLYT05] where every domain member (user) is associated
with a broker ; a form of centralisation. The broker collects distributed reputation ratings
for members and in return the member provides the broker with ratings after every
transaction. In this framework, there is an overhead on members on having to share
feedback with brokers after each transaction. A problem with this also is how ratings
provided by members can be trusted as the system assumes that users are diligent in
providing honest feedbacks. What if members decide to cover up from one another, how
does the system detect this?
Figure 3.2: System Model by Lin et al. [LLYT05]
The framework comprises 3 components: users, brokers and reputation authorities as
depicted in Figure 3.2. Users do not rely on a database managed by the same users but
on the brokers to collect reputation information. The reputation authority is a last resort
for information, in case there is insufficient information about any user. The reliance on a
TTP such as the broker and the reputation authority therefore, implies that the RTM is
not completely distributed in terms of architecture as claimed, but semi-distributed.
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A major problem of centralised systems is the scalability and the propagation of trust
ratings across the domains. This is because reputation gathering in large systems by
directly querying many members may result in significant communication overhead. The
TRAVOS [Tea06] reputation model suggests that within each domain, there is a reputation
broker agent. The agent is responsible for aggregating the opinions of all other agents
within its domain; that is, the opinion of a reputation broker about a domain member is an
aggregation of the opinions of all other members within its domain. Figure 3.3 illustrates
the semi-distributed architecture proposed.
Figure 3.3: Reputation brokering system in TRAVOS [Tea06]
Following these examples of semi-distributed systems, it can be said that there is a
need for a form of centralisation for an RTM to be adequately managed. This therefore
justifies the argument that for a reputation and trust management system to be effective,
there is a need of some form of central control. This fact is especially true in very critical
domains such as traffic management systems, military warfare application for monitoring
etc, where a TTP is required for quick decision making about the domain of application.
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3.11 Gap Analysis
Traditional RTMs rely on recommendations provided by entities in the domain to determine
the reputation of others. Each of the models addresses some of the trust issues though
some new issues are sometimes introduced during the process. This section discusses
currents issues of reputation management and motivates the use of a dynamic data-driven
and predictive model for reputation management. This also serves as the motivation for
the work done in this thesis.
3.11.1 Collusion
A common problem identified in the models is the vulnerability to collusion attacks [HB06].
Models applicable in the mobile networks domain make use of a component resident on
each node called watchdog mechanism. This component monitors its neighbourhood and
gathers data by promiscuous observation. Promiscuous observation means each entity
overhears the transmission of neighbours to detect misbehaviour. The mechanism requires
that every entity reports to the originator about the next entity. Once misbehaviour is
detected, a negative RV is stored. This detection mechanism also has a weakness of failing
to detect a misbehaving device in case of collusion attack [MGLB00].
Figure 3.4: Domain members can misbehave by colluding and covering up for one another
to deceive the system
An example of this attack can be described by having a set of sensor nodes that are
deployed monitor vehicular movement, as introduced in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The nodes
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collaborate to collect and process data that generate information about traffic conditions.
When a sensor node receives information from another, it is combined and fused with local
information before being sent to a server, in order to control traffic. Figure 3.4 depicts
collusion attack showing a downside of the watchdog mechanism. Knowing that sensor
networks are vulnerable to attacks due to their nature, an adversary compromises a sensor
node, which in turn compromises other nodes. Consider a normal situation, where for
example, sensor node A forwards a message to node B and B forwards the message to
C. Node C then forwards the message to node D. However, node C may decide to alter
the message before sending it to D. With the watchdog mechanism, it is possible that B
colludes with C and does not report to A when C alters message M, before forwarding the
message. Misbehaving nodes do not only have the chance to collude but can also propagate
false information. Therefore, trust decisions can be corrupted through recommendations
made by such nodes.
A similar example is considering two nodes A and B that are controlled by an attacker.
If node A tells B all of its secrets, then node B can masquerade as A to all of B’s neighbours
that node A shares pair-wise keys with and vice versa. The keys from each node that is
subsequently obtained node can be reused by other attacker-controlled nodes, cascading
the impact of the compromise. Therefore, an attacker can control a node undetectably by
physically compromising the node and the node in turn, compromising other nodes within
the network.
The assumption that all network nodes will operate in promiscuous mode is one that
is not feasible in a real life network. This is because nodes will require a considerable
amount of energy in overhearing another node’s transmission. Thus, a model that prevents
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members’ bias from influencing trust decisions is required.
3.11.2 Prediction
It is important that reputation is predictable for any reputation and trust-based system
to be effective. The system should indicate members’ trustworthiness and reliably predict
future cooperation [CLB10]. One major drawback of some existing models [WV03b,
WV03a, BLB04, TPJL05] of trust and reputation is that they do not focus on predictive
accuracy. These approaches do not propose any method for predicting the future RVs of
members in order to aid future trust-based decisions [HH07].
Intoxication attack occurs because the effect of past good behaviour outweighs the
effect of current actions on reputation. This research does not consider past observations
only, but also current and anticipated future events in the domain. Emphasis in D3-FRT
(described in Chapter 5) is placed on past histories, recent behaviour and the future
behaviour of members. Therefore giving the framework the desirable feature of prediction
and also resulting in a proactive approach to reputation management.
3.11.3 Architecture
The challenge of distributed reputation systems is how to aggregate RVs without a
centralised storage and management facility. Either that the system aggregates the ratings
of only a few members and does not have a wide view of the members’ reputation or it is
able to aggregate the RVs of all members, but leads to congestion in the system. Some
other problems of the distributed approach include:
• Extra traffic generation by information exchange [TKAS06];
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• Extra computation in accepting observed reputation information;
• Corruption of trust decisions through recommendations made by domain members.
Thus, decentralised approach exposes the system to false praise and accusation
attacks;
• Low computational power of some devices in the network, which does not allow for
complex analysis;
• Collusion attack may arise because the correct functioning of the system relies on
members that may have been compromised.
A centralised element can result in a bottleneck, a single point of failure or result in
lack of scalability. Despite these downsides, a centralised authority often leads to a simple
solution with less potential for manipulation by malicious outsiders.
Apart from the reasons listed above, a semi-distributed approach is most desirable.
The approach takes the responsibility of monitoring and determining the trustworthiness
from individual members and combines the advantages of the other two structures.
3.11.4 Other Gaps
Some of the existing models lack the high level of dynamism required for spontaneous and
ever changing networks. Dynamism is referred to, in terms of the provision of runtime trust
rating by the models, and prediction of future behaviour of each member of the network.
We argue that trust calls for a dynamic approach for its computation. Dynamics of trust
is also reflected by its timeliness; reputation is aggregated in time by taking into account
recent behaviour and past histories [LI04]. Hence, time is also a necessary dimension for
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reputation. This makes the framework useful as it considers a node in different future
scenarios and provides a more holistic view of domain events. In addition to being dynamic
in making predictions, the D3-FRT provides information about the system in good time.
Existing models such as eBay use a combination of average recommendations and the
number of transactions performed by an entity as indicators of its rating. However, from
[SL06] using a simple average does not guard against fluctuating behaviour or false praise
and accusations. A dependable RTM should be able to identify and punish misbehaviour
for such fluctuations because malicious entities may strategically alter their behaviour for
their benefits. Therefore, an adaptive framework that can handle strategic fluctuations in
behaviour is required for trust management.
The small size of nodes limits their storage and computational power and prevents them
from carrying out complex analyses. However, in the models described in this chapter, each
node has to monitor, calculate and maintain reputation information about other nodes in
network. Since each node maintains reputation values of every other node, storing such
information requires more storage at each node. For example, in [BLB05, BLB02, MM02],
every node has to maintain O(N) reputation information, where N is the number of nodes
in the network [TKAS06].
Ensuring identity persistence is another problem that remains despite the trust man-
agement solutions that have been proposed. If the reputation of each node is tied to its
identity within the network, it will prevent excluded or isolated malicious nodes from
gaining entrance again into the network, under another identity (identity spoofing). In
the models described, there is a chance for a badly rated node to disappear and reappear
with a different identity.
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Additionally, through theoretical analysis, it has been confirmed that direct (first-hand)
observations improve accuracy and are better than second-hand information [BMLB08].
The performance of first-hand information coincide on some range (if and only if the
θ > 2∆, where θ is the probability that a well behaving member is indeed observed
as behaving well).∆ is the threshold for which the difference between first-hand and
second-hand information should not exceed.
Furthermore, in the case of P2P file sharing P2P networks, some research suggested
that 50% of shared files exchanged on Kazaa were infected. On Gnutella as well, 70%
of peers free-riding other members by not sharing files but instead downloading from
others [LYG+07]. This implies that there is a requirement to decrease these types of
misbehaviours among peers; a need well suited for a dynamic trust management framework.
3.12 Summary
In summary, RTMs have gained popularity because they have shown to be promising in the
area of trust management. In this chapter, we discussed the interlink between reputation
and trust, and models that have contributed significantly to this area of research are
reviewed. In the qualitative analysis done, the conclusion is that as these models try to
solve the problems of reputation and trust management, other problems are introduced
such as the susceptibility to collusion attacks.
A comparative analysis of these models and a gap analysis are discussed extensively
in this chapter. Intoxication occurs due to the use of histories alone in determining the
reputation of domain entities. This chapter discusses how relying on historical information
only is inadequate using this approach as members can deceive the system.
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The semi-distributed architecture to trust management is described in this chapter. This
architecture combines the advantages of both centralised and fully distributed architectures.
Furthermore, dynamism is a gap that has not been the focus of previous work and we have
described how this gap can result in a reactive approach. With these research problems
in mind, the provision of recent information about domain activities and corresponding
computations of reputation/trust will make such models more proactive giving the system
adequate time to make preventive measures.
This thesis aims to contribute towards the provision of reliable reputation management
for critical domains that require the cooperation of members to be effective. This involves
running tests and simulations on the proposed approach in a variety of scenarios and with
different input parameters. It is hoped that the insight gained from the results presented
will be effective in making predictions and providing useful information for stakeholders
that will result in a proactive approach to reputation management.
Chapter 4
Reputation and Trust Dynamics: A
Data-Driven Simulation Approach
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part describes in detail the DDDAS
paradigm, an approach of a symbiotic relation between applications and simulations. In
the second part of this chapter, we argue on the usefulness and applicability of DDDAS
paradigm in the domain of reputation management. The paradigm’s primitives and how
they fit for the trust dynamics issues are also discussed in the second part.
In DDDAS, an application can accept and respond dynamically to new data injected
into the executing application, and in reverse, such an application has the ability to
dynamically control itself. The data is fed online or from a data archive and will then be
used to influence the measurements for additional data it may require. Such capabilities
provide more accurate analysis and prediction, more precise controls, and more reliable
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outcomes [Dar04, Dou08].
Several requirements and recent technological advances render DDDAS approaches
more opportune than ever. These new realities call for more advanced methods of systems
analysis and management. The methods required, go beyond the static modelling and
simulation methods of the past, to new methods, such as DDDAS which augment and
enhance the system models through continually updated information from monitoring,
feedback and control aspects of the system. Together with these driving needs of emer-
ging systems, several technological and methodological advances have produced added
opportunities and impetus for DDDAS approaches [Dar10].
Figure 4.1: DDDAS feedback-loop between systems and simulation
DDDAS involves dynamic information exchange and control between the application
and the measurement systems, where each dynamically affects the behaviour of the other
with potential improvement in their effectiveness. The relationship between a system
and simulation as suggested in DDDAS is given in Figure 4.1. Such tight and dynamic
integration presents special challenges because it addresses application domains in which
highly sophisticated but segregated simulation and measurement approaches diverge and
often fail to predict real system behaviour. DDDAS requires algorithms with guaranteed
stability properties under dynamic data inputs [DDD06].
Current researches in DDDAS focus on simulations of physical, artificial and social
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entities [KTS+07, MSB06]. The simulation can make predictions about an entity, regarding
how it will change and what its future state will be. The simulation is then continuously
adjusted with data gathered from the entity. The predictions made by the simulation
can then influence (control) how and where future data will be gathered from the entity
in order to focus on areas of uncertainty [KT06]. Intelligent agents will be required to
make decisions on which data to incorporate, when it should be incorporated, and how
it should be incorporated. In addition, the predictions can be useful for updating the
simulation parameters in order to make more precise predictions in the future. Many of
these simulations are inspired by older models used to make predictions about physical
systems [Dar04] such as in sensor networks, weather forecasting, traffic management etc.
4.2 Dynamic Data-Driven Application Systems
In this section, a review of existing DDDAS is provided. The systems are selected not
only for their significant contribution but also for their capabilities and diversity in terms
of benefiting from the paradigm. The selection is also based on their methodology for
data handling, adaptive input parameters and predictive capability, which are attributes
that are important to this research. The use of agent-based modelling as a simulation
component and a similar domain of applications are factors that influenced our DDDAS
selection in this section. The approach, strength(s), weakness(es) of each of the DDDAS
and gaps are identified and discussed here. The objective of this review is to learn from
existing work, new insights that can influence our decisions with dealing with the dynamic
nature of reputation and trust. We consider the characteristics of the systems and highlight
useful methods that are a fit for the purpose of this research.
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4.2.1 Event Correlations in Sensor Networks
Reducing the number of sensors, unnecessary communication and energy consumption are
the reasons for discovering salient correlation between the events in a sensor network. For
example, if the relations between factors such as temperature and humidity are known,
one factor can be determined from knowing the value of the other.
The event correlations research [NWC09] extracts correlations from a large number of
sensors instead of using a traditional method based on an apriori algorithm and pattern
growth. The method is event-driven and discovers specific valuable patterns instead of a
complete pattern set. Algorithms are incorporated to improve efficiency for discovering
concise and accurately correlated patterns.
Through experiments, Ni et al. [NWC09] show that the method is both highly effective
and efficient. The goal is to discover anomalous events in a large sensor network where
the structure is unknown. The algorithm proposed enables users to select the correlation
confidence level and only display the significant event correlations.
4.2.2 Leveraging the Cell Phone Network
During a disaster, emergency response managers require timely alerts and quality in-
formation about the location and movement of the entire affected population. Reports
from on-scene coordinators, first responders, public safety officials, the news media, and
the affected population are often inaccurate, conflicting and incomplete with gaps in
geographical and temporal coverage. Additionally, those reports must be merged into a
coherent evolving picture of the entire affected area to enable emergency managers to
effectively respond [MSB06].
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Integrated Wireless Phone Based Emergency Response System (WIPER) [MSB06],
uses wireless call data, including call volume, who calls whom, call duration, services in use,
and cell phone location information for emergencies. WIPER selects from data streams in
the physical vicinity of a communication or any traffic anomaly and dynamically injects it
into an Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation (ABMS) system to classify and predict the
unfolding of the emergency in real time. This approach that is adopted in this research as
detailed in Chapter 5. The ABMS dynamically steers local data collection in the vicinity
of the anomaly. Multiple distributed data collection, monitoring, analysis, simulation and
decision support modules are integrated using a Service Oriented Architecture to generate
traffic forecasts and emergency alerts for stakeholders. Both the reliability of the cellular
phone system during a disaster, and privacy concerns present potential limitations to the
WIPER system.
4.2.3 Rail Monitorring
The complex dynamics and the ever changing environment in which rail systems are exposed
limit the use of classical simulation. Changing environmental conditions and second order
dynamics challenge the validity of the rail system models and seriously reduce model
(re)usability. Several challenges in rail transport have been identified such as handling
large volume of data, classification of data, the selection of data, the implementation of
different data analysis methods, and the difficulties of data interpretation [HSV10].
The research into automated model calibration and validation to rail transit simulation
[HV09] describes the potential benefits of the DDDAS in the domain. Emphasis is placed
on automated model reconfiguration, calibration, and validation through the use of data
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Figure 4.2: The Simulation Process [HSV10]
analysis methods. The work aims at capturing both first and second-order dynamics of the
system from the onset. The main effort is to employ computational logic that continually
performs model validation and calibration using the extensive available data during a
simulation run.
This research gives a generic data-driven simulation process (in Figure 4.2) that can be
used with other tools in other applications, which is a step towards a generic library for
dynamic data-driven model calibration and validation. In this process, the model output
and measurements from the system are continually compared. Once the deviation exceeds
a predefined threshold, the model parameters should be updated based on data analysis
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results. Different analysis methods need to be available to discover useful hidden patterns
in the data sets, and to estimate the parameters. Mechanisms should be defined to enable
saving model states and parameter configurations as a reference for ulterior comparison or
model state rollback [HV09].
4.2.4 Injecting Dynamic Real-Time Data into a DDDAS
There are several tools for mitigating damages caused by fires such as fire propagation
simulators that use physical or mathematical models. Most simulators of natural phe-
nomena however, demand high computing resources and require as inputs, a wide set of
variables whose values are either not well known or estimated prior to execution including
a considerable degree of uncertainty. Setting up inputs at the beginning of a simulation
process is a major drawback because as the simulation time continues, variables previously
initialised can dramatically change and thus, produce inaccurate results [RCM10].
Figure 4.3: Prediction methods by Rodriguez et al. [RCM10]
The fire propagation prediction research (depicted in Figure 4.3) uses DDDAS meth-
odologies to predict wild fire propagation. The focus is on reducing the execution time
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and improving the prediction results of a DDDAS for fire spread prediction. This method
improves dynamic adaptation to sudden changes in environmental conditions. The predic-
tion uses fixed environmental conditions as the Fire Simulator’s (FS) input variables at
time instant t0 where the fire simulator is used to predict fire evolution at instant t1. This
time interval (t0 − t1) is called the prediction stage. Another stage is included before the
prediction stage, where the simulator’s input parameters are calibrated, depending on the
observed fire behaviour. The two-stage fire prediction methodology reduces the negative
impact of input parameters’ uncertainty. Though the execution time with this approach
was reduced by 20 times, the prediction improvements were quite similar to the results
obtained applying the previous prediction schemes.
Following the review above of the applications that have benefited from DDDAS, it
can be seen that DDDAS is a useful paradigm:
• In domains where there are uncertainties (dynamism),
• Where there is a need to draw conclusions (predictions/forecast) from the captured
events,
• In the presence of large volumes of data that needs to be collected, processed and
interpreted.
Furthermore, the paradigm is capable of providing valuable information about how a
domain can evolve over time and the components that stakeholders need to focus on in
order to maintain a trusted system.
Knowing that these are requirements of an effective trust model, we can conclde that
DDDAS is fit for the reputation and trust management landscape. In addition, adopting
the paradigm approach opens a whole new approach to managing trust and reputation.
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4.3 Dynamic Data-Driven Application Systems and
Reputation Management
4.3.1 Trust Dynamics
Trust dynamics can be described as the influence of changes in a domain, computations
and prediction on the same domain. The consideration of trust dynamics issues in the
methodology adopted by any reputation and trust management system is critical to the
success of the system. Govindan and Mohapatra in [GM12b] described trust dynamics as
the evolution of reputation over time, i.e., the changes in behavioural patterns of an entity
with time. The dynamic and changing nature of reputation and trust has been established
earlier in this thesis. This nature may arise as a result of different factors in the application
domain; factors such as: collaboration, attacks in the domain or on the reputation system,
mobility among members such as wireless sensors, changing topology etc. For example,
factors that may influence trust dynamics in a network scenario can be the mobility of
the nodes and the number of nodes that are collaborating in the network. In addition,
the dynamic nature of trust makes RTMs vulnerable to attacks such as intoxication as
described in the publications arising from this thesis [OBT10, OTB11].
The dynamics of trust can be characterised by trust propagation or information sharing,
prediction and aggregation [GM12b]. Trust propagation is based on the transitive property
of trust. Propagation of trust deals with the approach with which trust information is
communicated across the domain. Different approaches to trust propagation have been
proposed in literature and these are given in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
Some models in literature focus majorly on trust dynamics and acknowledging that
existing models still suffer from sudden changes and dynamic domain events. Chang et
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al. [CWG06], suggested the use of a fading factor, which discounts older evidences, to
capture the oscillations in peer behaviour in a P2P network. In the fading scheme, a
forgetting factor is used; a function of recent observations in the domain. Relying on the
forgetting factor only, can therefore result in the exploitation of the reputation system
where an entity may decide to wait for a certain time interval for histories to fade before
misbehaving again.
SecuredTrust [DI12] on the other hand, handles changes in behaviour by using a
deviation reliability function. In the absence of interactions with other agents, an agent’s
trust should degrade gradually using a decaying (forgetting) factor. The predicted trust in
SecuredTrust however, relies on recent and historical observations. As stated in previous
chapters, relying on recent observations alone is inadequate for effective trust management.
In addition, none of these approaches anticipate possible future events such as member
behaviour in the domain in making trust predictions and decisions; which our DDDAS-
inspired approach can provide.
The approach presented in this thesis focuses on trust dynamics in the areas of
prediction and aggregation only. Propagation has been dealt with extensively in literature:
[GBS08, MM02, BLB02]. In this research, we give a definition to trust prediction by
describing the concept as the anticipation of the possible events that can occur in the
domain in the future and computing a representing rating (RV) for each involved entity. In
order to aggregate the RVs, observed events are converted to useful metrics and combined
to obtain a single value (referred to as reputation value so far in this thesis). In addition,
the aggregation of trust is the technique with which ratings are gathered from different
sources and how the RV is computed from the same ratings. Several approaches to trust
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aggregation have been adopted in literature as detailed in the review of Chapter 3, while
the methodology adopted in D3-FRT is discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
4.3.2 Gap Analysis
In this research, the dynamic nature of trust and reputation is controlled by exploiting the
primitives of the DDDAS paradigm; which includes measurement, simulation, feedback and
control mechanisms (which were described in Chapter 4). The dynamic nature of trust
makes it difficult to detect sudden and changing behaviour that is actually considered as
misbehaviour in an application domain. For this reason the DDDAS concept, which is an
equally dynamic approach, is fit for identifying and isolating misbehaving members.
The pending issue of collusion attack shows that there is a need of identifying, monit-
oring and predicting misbehaviour of domain members. Therefore, a feedback system that
will aid making dynamic, informed and security-aware decisions is required for RTM.
The missing elements of traditional RTMs that have been identified so far are:
1. Provision of dynamic RVs to identify malicious members
2. Prediction of future RVs to prevent misbehaviour
3. Reliance on members for trust decision resulting in collusion
4. Segmentation into regions of risk to focus on regions of high-risk
In the next sub-sections, we describe how the DDDAS inspired framework can fill these
elements.
76 Reputation and Trust Dynamics: A Data-Driven Simulation Approach
4.3.3 The Paradigm in this Thesis
This research adopts the concept of the DDDAS paradigm in order to address the is-
sue of dynamism of trust and collusion attack amongst domain members. The recent
measurements (data about observations and behaviour) are simulated to gain a better
understanding and a more accurate prediction of the level of trust for each member. The
simulation dynamically measures trust levels, and continually incorporates new measure-
ments immediately (the simulation cycle is illustrated in Figure 4.4). This will enable the
simulation to determine and feedback the reputation of each node into the system. The
output of the simulation will help control the domain in terms of decisions to be made as
depicted in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.4: Simulation Cycle
One of the missing elements of traditional RTMs is the reliable prediction of future
RVs of members to proactively prevent misbehaviour. The classification of members
into different levels of risk is also an important missing element. This classification can
potentially help the RTM to focus on members that are of high-risk in the domain.
Hence, we propose a framework that:
1. Predicts the future RVs using past events, recent events and possible future interac-
tions
2. Provides information about members that are classified as high-risk
4.3 Dynamic Data-Driven Application Systems and Reputation Management77
Figure 4.5: The feedback loop between the physical system and simulation
3. Prevents members’ bias from influencing trust decisions
4. Provides dynamic RVs of domain members.
The manner in which the DDDAS approach fits with the RTM approach considered
in this thesis is given in Figure 4.6. The application of DDDAS for trust management,
which is the novelty of this research, provides dynamism in the detection of misbehaving
members and prediction of future ratings.
Figure 4.6: The proposed approach in connection with both DDDAS and requirements for
reputation management systems
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4.4 Summary
This chapter discusses the DDDAS computational model in the context of examples of
novel capabilities enabled through its implementation in different application areas. The
models have given insights to how DDDAS can be applied in our case which is mainly
directed towards trust dynamics issues. We considered the salient characteristics of the
DDDAS and highlight useful methods that are fit for our purpose. From our study, the
DDDAS feedback loop comes with high potential pay-off by providing timely information
for controls within the domain. Therefore, the creation of a framework with predictive
capabilities; a new methodology for more efficient and effective measurement processes are
the benefits of adopting the paradigm in this research.
Dynamism and predictive capabilities are some of the outstanding properties of some
existing reputation models (described in Chapter 3) and the simulation and feedback
system proposed is useful for making predictions about how a domain may evolve with
time. The predictive capability of DDDAS is exploited by D3-FRT for providing dynamic
recent ratings and predictions of possible future ratings in a system of participants. In
addition, making components of trust configurable is advantageous for effectiveness in
dynamic systems.
Finally, this chapter focuses on the usefulness of DDDAS for providing more reliable
reputation management in trust-reliant application domains. We described how the concept
of DDDAS can feed into reputation management through D3-FRT making it a solution for
trust and reputation management issues. The adoption of a dynamic data-driven approach
motivated by DDDAS is the first of its kind and serves as the novelty of this research. For
the reasons listed in this chapter, we can conclude that the paradigm is a useful approach
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for reputation management because of its capability in addressing the inherent dynamic
issues of trust and reputation.
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Part III
It is bad enough that so many people
believe things without any evidence.
What is worse is that some people
have no conception of evidence
and regard facts as just someone else’s opinion.
Thomas Sowell
Chapter 5
A Predictive Framework for
Modelling Reputation
5.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the Dynamic Data-Driven Framework for Reputation management.
The D3-FRT framework benefits from the outcomes of literature reviews in Chapters 3 and
4 of this thesis. From these reviews, we have identified some requirements that are useful
for the effectiveness of any trust-based and dynamic reputation system. The identified
requirements are highlighted below and they serve as a part of the contribution of this
research to the body of knowledge:
• Having a predictive capability is an essential criterion for any RTM. Generally, RTMs
make use of past events as an indication for future behaviour and this has been shown
to be inadequate in [OTB11, OBT11]. For an RTM to be reliable and effective in
trust management, trust has to be predictable. We propose that predictions should
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be based on past events, recent events and possible future interactions.
• The dynamic computation of RVs is important because trust and reputation are
dynamic, i.e they constantly change as a result of interactions and other environ-
mental/domain factors. The dynamic property of reputation and trust was described
in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
• Preventing of members’ bias that may influence trust decisions, and which can result
into collusion attacks in the system.
• Providing an online decision support system that allows stakeholders to make in-
formed decisions about the domain in question.
This chapter describes D3-FRT as it captures these requirements and how the requirements
are implemented. The components of the proposed framework are described individually
in the early part of the chapter and the inter-relationships between the components
are detailed in later sections. We discuss the relevance of agent-based modelling to our
DDDAS-inspired framework initially in this chapter. Thereafter, the initial version of the
D3-FRT, its downsides and the improved version are then described in detail.
5.2 Overview of the Realisation of the D3-FRT
Model
The development of D3-FRT is based on the outcomes from the survey and literature review
of the preceding chapters. An initial high-level architecture for the D3-FRT framework was
designed. By keeping in mind the requirements of trust management we have identified
and the DDDAS primitives that make the requirements realisable. Without going into
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much detail at this point, the following diagram (Figure 5.1) depicts the initial version
of the D3-FRT. A more detailed description of the framework and its components are in
Sections 5.7 and 5.8 of this Chapter.
Figure 5.1: High-level diagram of initial version of D3-FRT
In order to implement the framework, an ABMS approach is adopted and this is
justified by its capability to provide insightful views of the past, present and future state
of a system. This capability aids the fulfilment of D3-FRT’s property of anticipating
and making predictions about the future state of the system. Recursive Porous Agent
Simulation Toolkit (Repast) ABMS is selected to be used as a proof of concept for designing
a refined version of the framework. We extended the Rapast [Rep11] for modelling the
D3-FRT framework in this research. Figure 5.2 depicts the implementation architecture
of D3-FRT, which is an extension of the toolkit for the purpose of this research. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time the toolkit is being extended to the problem of
reputation and trust. With this extension, D3-FRT becomes a flexible model of interacting
agents that provide facilities to store, display and activate agent behaviour.
An iterative design approach was followed in designing the D3-FRT model, as it is
considered the most effective for practical model development [MN10, NM07]. This process
started with an initial description of D3-FRT components and agent behaviours, including
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Figure 5.2: Implementation Architecture Extending Repast
the initial state of the system. This description was then converted to an initial functional
model that was executed to generate some results. On examining the results, the model
is refined and re-run until the expected behaviours and results were obtained. Some
important model design questions [MN10] were answered and these answers aided the
development of the model design. These questions include:
1. How can the issues of trust dynamics be solved by the model?
2. What added-value would agent-based modelling in addition to the DDDAS approach
provide to address the problem that other approaches cannot add?
3. What should the agents be in the model? Who are the decision makers in the system?
What are the characteristic behaviours of the entities involved? What data on agents
are simply descriptive (static attributes)? What agent attributes would be computed
endogenously by the model and updated in the agents (dynamic attributes)?
4. What is the agents’ environment? How do the agents interact with the environment?
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5. What agent behaviours are of interest? What decisions do the agents make? What
behaviours are being acted upon? What actions are being taken by the agents?
6. How do the agents interact with each other and the environment? How expansive or
focused are agent interactions?
7. Where might the data come from, especially on agent behaviours, for our model?
Answers to these questions are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
5.3 Postulations of Trust Framework
D3-FRT is potentially more proactive compared to other RTMs (described in detail in
Chapter 2) because the framework aims to anticipate misbehaviour before an attack occurs
[OBT11]. This is done with the use of past interactions among domain members, their
recent and anticipated future RVs for trust management. The advantage of this proactive
approach is that informed decisions can be made before misbehaviour occurs as illustrated
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. We refer to proactivity in terms of providing control such as
downgrading of RV of suspect members that are predicted to be malicious before they
can carry out an attack. The premise is that a member who has been compromised by an
adversary exhibits a sequence of steps in order to misbehave. Proactivity in this research is
the provision of useful information to stakeholders for countermeasures that can effectively
reduce the effect of misbehaviour.
The hypothetical example in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 shows the difference in response
times between the proposed approach and others. Figure 5.3 shows that the RV is
only downgraded at time t5 after misbehaviour. D3-FRT can potentially predict the
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Figure 5.3: Reactive approaches that compute ratings after each member interaction
misbehaviour between time interval t1 and t2 and the RV is downgraded at time t3 in
Figure 5.4. This is different to how other approaches work; that only downgrade RVs as a
reaction to misbehaviour. Therefore, misbehaving members continue to attack until the
reputation system identifies the misbehaviour.
Figure 5.4: Proactive approach that predicts misbehaviour
This capability fits within the DDDAS paradigm and it enables D3-FRT to perform
better by making predictions about the possible future RVs of members. The prediction
gives the system adequate time for preventive measures.
Furthermore, D3-FRT aims to rate agents and predict agents’ RVs in a manner that
represents exhibited behaviours. The graph in Figure 5.5 depicts the expectations of the
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output from the framework which are changes to the RVs of agents depending on the
behaviours that are exhibited.
Figure 5.5: Expected changes to RVs as agents exhibit different behaviours as time
progresses
In the figure, MAX and MIN ratings are the maximum and minimum allowable RVs
in the system respectively while Neural rating is the default RV for all domain members.
The threshold is the minimum rating an agent can have to remain reputable; any value
below the threshold is punishable depending on the nature of the application.
5.4 An Agent-Based Model Approach
ABMS is an approach to modelling systems composed of autonomous, interacting agents.
In addition, agent-based modelling is a way to model the dynamics of complex systems
and complex adaptive systems. Such systems often self-organise themselves and create an
emergent order. Agent-based models also include models of behaviour (human or otherwise)
which are used to observe the collective effects of agent behaviours and interactions. The
development of agent modelling tools, the availability of micro-data, and advances in
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computation have made possible a growing number of agent-based applications across a
variety of domains and disciplines [MN10].
ABMS is widely used to understand systems composed of interacting individuals
[NM07] (agent). These agents are the peers, nodes, participants, users and members
that collaborate for a purpose in a domain. The term collaborate in this context is the
interaction between agents in a specific domain. For example, consider mobile sensor
nodes in a network monitoring vehicular movement as described in Chapter 1. The act
of exchanging captured evidence between these nodes is referred to as collaboration. In
this research, we use an ABMS approach that takes the agents and their interactions and
embed them into our computational framework.
Due to the complexity (interactions and interdependencies) of the systems in use these
days, a dynamic approach to prediction is required to capture all requirements, to have
a close representation of reality. ABMS is suitable as evolving and dynamic behavioural
changes in the domain are a major consideration for this research.
Provision of useful information to control the systems is another justification for the
use of ABMS. For example, when agents optimise their collective behaviour through simple
exchanges of information as is done in an ant colony optimisation [MN09], the purpose
is to achieve a desired end-state, that is, an optimised system, rather than to simulate a
dynamic process for its own sake.
Therefore, the choice of ABMS in this research resulted from the following requirements
and properties:
• The problem consists of interacting agents.
• Scaling up is an important consideration of this research as the framework has to be
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tested in various scenarios.
• Agents can change their behaviours with time and there is dynamism in agent
interaction patterns.
• There are well-defined and outlined decisions and behaviours.
• As stated in Sections 1.2 and 3.11.2, relying on past histories only is not effective
for trust management. ABMS is useful for when the past is a poor predictor of the
future.
The adoption of ABMS approach in D3-FRT allows for prediction from the knowledge of
the behaviours of the agents, i.e. modelling how the system would mostly likely evolve
over time.
Finally, ABMS allows for testing to identify how the configurations and rules make the
system evolve and their effects on the agent interaction patterns.
5.5 Agent-Based Modelling in D3-FRT
5.5.1 Modelling and Simulation
As stated by Macal and North [MN06], ABMS can be described as the act of simulating
the actions and interactions of agents repeatedly over time in order to assess their effects
on the system. There is no universal agreement on the precise definition of the term agent
in the context of ABMS, but this research has adopted a computer science perspective
which is a discrete entity with its own goals and behaviours with a capability to adapt and
modify its behaviours. This requires agents to be responders and planners rather than
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purely passive components [NM07]. Agents are diverse, heterogeneous, and dynamic in
their attributes and behavioural rules, as shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: A typical agent by Macal and North in [MN10]
Agents have internal and external properties referred to as state variables. Some
variables such as Agent identifier (AgentID), Agent type (trusted, misbehaving etc) are
static while others such as RVs may change with time. Changes in the state variables may
either be as a result of the influence of the internal in-built logic in the agent or as a result
of cooperating with another entity as shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: Properties of agents in simulation
In the modelling of the D3-FRT and its components, a mixture of Java, Groovy, and
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flowcharts are used. In the model, agents are organised into their space through the use of
contexts and projections. From a modelling perspective, the context represents an abstract
population while objects in a context are the population of a model. Projections take
the population as specified in a context and impose a new structure on it. This structure
defines relationships on the population by using the semantics in the projection. In other
words, an agent population is realised once a projection is applied to it. From a practical
point of view, this implies that projections are added to a context to allow the agents to
interact with one another. Projections have many-to-one relationship with contexts, while
contexts can have arbitrary number of projections associated, which implies that within
each context, the agents can create an arbitrary number or types of relationships with
each other [Rep11].
The context-projection relationship adopted in this research is depicted in Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.8: The relationships between agents in the system, contexts and projections
In the D3-FRT model, agents belong to a context, which is an abstract population of
the system. The message exchange between these agents is defined within the context.
Context-sensitive behaviour is implemented in the system by triggers created in the agents.
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For example, it is until the RV of an agent passes a predefined threshold that the agent
type is identified as a misbehaving agent.
Agents in D3-FRT are connected by dynamic links which unlike static links that are
predefined and do not change. The dynamic links imply that our framework allows for
dynamic interaction between agents in the system.
Therefore in summary, the structure of D3-FRT model as recommended in [MN10] has
three elements:
1. A set of agents, their attributes and behaviours.
2. A set of agent relationships and methods of interaction: An underlying topology of
connectedness defines how and with whom agents interact.
3. The agents’ environment: Agents interact with their environment in addition to
other agents.
5.5.2 Agent Behaviours, Properties and Rules
Simulation agents have behaviours, often described by simple rules, and interactions with
other agents, which in turn influence their behaviours [MN09]. D3-FRT agents have
behavioural features that include decision rules to select their actions of deciding on which
other agent to interact with. The decision rules on which agents collaborate govern agent
behaviours by employing the Bayesian theory [Bay63, HU93]. For an agent to collaborate
with another, conditional probabilities are used. In order to determine the posterior
probability that two agents collaborate, given the prior probability that both agents have
close ratings in the system is considered. The RVs of the agents are maintained by the
controller, which is the TTP in the system. The values are dependent on the behaviours
5.5 Agent-Based Modelling in D3-FRT 93
exhibited by the agents overtime. From these values, the posterior probability of both
agents collaborating can be determined.
An example is the hypothesis that agents A1 and A2 exchange a message given that
they are rated almost equally or their RVs are within a close range.
P (A|x) = P (x|A)P (A)
P (x)
=
P (x|A)P (A)
P (x|A)P (A) + P (x|B)P (B) (5.1)
P (A) is the prior probability of the hypothesis regardless of any other information
in Equation 5.1. That is, the probability that A1 and A2 collaborate while P (B) is the
probability there is no collaboration. The difference in ratings of the agents is denoted as x;
it is the evidence that their RVs are in range and this value depends on the implementation
of the application domain. P (x) refers the probability of x. P (x|A) is the conditional
probability of seeing the evidence, if the hypothesis above is true. This is referred to as
the likelihood function. That is, the probability that the agents have similar ratings given
that they collaborate. While P (x|B) is the probability that they have similar ratings
but do not collaborate. The posterior probability P (A|x) of A given x; is the estimate of
the probability that the agents exchanging a message is true taking the evidence of their
RVs into account. In D3-FRT’s simulation component, the probability that the agents
collaborate or not are both 0.5, that is, P (A) = P (B) = 0.5 and P (x|A) >> P (x|B).
The following are the other rules that change the state of agents and these rules
represent agent behaviour.
Rule 1: RV ranges between [0...5], and an agent will have a neutral state at the onset.
This implies that the agent has a RV of 2.5.
Rule 2: An agent’s reputation value will be decremented if it interacts with agents that
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are not trusted.
Rule 3: An agent’s reputation value will be incremented if it interacts with other trusted
agents.
Rule 4: An agent will be in a high-risk region if its computed value is 1 and below. This
implies that the state of the agent is not trusted.
Rule 5: An agent will be in a medium-risk region if its computed value is above 1 but
below 4.
Rule 6: An agent will be in a low-risk region if its computed value is above 4. This implies
that the agent is at a trusted state.
For the modelling purposes of this research, the following properties and attributes
[MN10] of agents are applied:
• Agents are social and they interact with other agents using application specific
mechanism of communicating causing agent states to change.
• The agents are self-contained as they are uniquely identifiable using AgentIDs with
a set of characteristics, behaviours and attributes and belong to a region of trust.
RV is a metric encapsulating the reputation of each agent and determines the trust
region it will automatically belong to. The trust region concept is further discussed
in Section 5.7 of this chapter.
• Autonomy and self-directness: The agents can function independently and interact
with other agents and controller by exchanging of messages and influence.
• Agents have behaviours that relate information sensed by each agent to its decisions
and actions. An agent’s information comes through interactions with other agents
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and with the environment.
• Each agent has a state that changes over time. That is, a state that represents the
essential variables associated with the agent’s current situation.
5.5.3 The Concept of Time
Timing is an important consideration of this research as it has a great impact on how the
agents and the system in general evolve. Agent-based models can either be synchronous
or asynchronous. In synchronous models, all agents are assumed to change simultaneously.
The calling order of the objects has no influence in this mode but conflicts can arise when
agents compete over limited resources. With asynchronous updating, agents change in
turn, each observing the reality left by the previous agent and conflicts between agents
are therefore resolved. In fact, the order of updating (often, but not necessarily, random)
is critical as it may influence model results [Cro07]. Therefore, the asynchronous method
of time is adopted in D3-FRT, simulating a chronological sequence of events.
In D3-FRT, the schedule function used combines Time-Step and Discrete-Event simu-
lation schedule that uses an integer counter to track the progression of time. Time steps
(referred to as ticks) from 0 to 1 and so on, i.e. {0, 1, 2, ..., t− 1} are used to prioritise
events, rather than a simulation clock, where t is the current time. Agent behaviour occurs
at one of these time steps. In addition, this approach allows for multiple agent behaviours
to occur at the same time which is fit for the purpose of the D3-FRT framework.
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5.6 Semi-Distributed Approach
In Chapter 2, the benefits and downsides of purely distributed and centralised architectures
for RTMs are discussed. The justification for a semi-distributed framework is also detailed
in the chapter. D3-FRT is a data-driven framework whose goal is to use data obtained
from agent interactions for making informed trust decisions through the reputation system
[OBT09, OBT10, OTB11, OBT11, OBT12]. In order to achieve this goal, we propose a
semi-distributed system architecture. This is because the ultimate aim of any RTM is to
achieve trusted communication among a network of agents by meeting certain requirements.
Firstly, there is a requirement for monitoring the behaviour of agents at runtime and
providing feedback to the RTM. Secondly, prediction of agents’ RVs is necessary and having
a more proactive approach to the detection of malicious members is another requirement.
Application of primitives: dynamic measurement, simulation, feedback and control
in D3-FRT provides dynamism in the detection of malicious agents and prediction of
future behaviour of each agent. The runtime measurements (behaviour of agents which
is converted to RVs) are simulated to gain a better understanding and a more accurate
prediction of the level of trust for each agent. The simulation dynamically obtains RVs, and
continuously incorporates new data online. This will enable the simulation to determine
and feedback the reputation of each agent into the system. The output of the simulation
will help control the system in terms of decisions to be made, to maintain a trusted
communications among agents. The DDDAS paradigm requirement of a TTP is to
monitor, simulate, feedback measurements in the system.
In modelling D3-FRT, the reputation of other agents is not entirely determined and
managed by individual agents in the system but by a middle layer of trusted super-
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agents (Cluster Heads (CHs)) with higher computational power (similar to the hierarchical
intrusion detection systems [RMK08]) and through simulation. Figure 5.9 shows the
hierarchy of the agents in the system as described in Onolaja et al. [OBT11].
Figure 5.9: Hierarchical topology
5.6.1 Postulations
In modelling the D3-FRT, the following postulations were applied:
• The controller and CHs are assumed to be secure since a compromise of these
components would render the reputation system useless. The functionality of the
controller can be spread across multiple hosts for fault-tolerance and robustness; this
implies that most if not all of the hosts have to be compromised before the whole
system can be compromised.
• Generally, agents such as sensor nodes are constrained by limited resources such
as low computational power and energy resources. This limitation does not allow
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for complex cryptographic requirement, algorithms or computations. Therefore, no
trust requirements are placed on the domain agents.
• In order to prevent agents from having multiple identities, it is assumed that each
agent is bound to an identity and cannot spoof different identities. This will ensure
that agents have a verifiable and non-repudiable identity. Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) is a method by which IP can be provided with the controller acting as the
Certificate Authority.
5.7 Initial Version of D3-FRT
At initialisation, a cynical approach is adopted where each agent has a neutral rating
of 2.5; note that RVs range from [05]], where a score of 0 means an agent is completely
untrusted, 5 means an agent is absolutely trusted and if 0 < RV < 5, then it implies
that the agent is trusted to a certain extent. Each agent has three global variables: θh,
θo and θf which are the historical, recent and predicted future ratings respectively. This
agent property remains the same value until the agent demonstrates its trustworthiness or
maliciousness through collaboration with other agents. The behaviour of each agent will
determine the adjustment of its RV accordingly.
Figure 5.10 below shows the sequence of events that occur when an agent wishes to
collaborate with another. Agent A registers its presence with a CH and obtains a unique
AgentID and a θo of 2.5. The network of agents is partitioned into clusters, where each
cluster has a head: CH, which is a super-agent and has a direct connection with every
other member of the cluster. The idea of clustering is a physical structure of the system.
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CHs have a higher capacity and enhanced capabilities in terms of computational power,
energy and storage in comparison to other agents.
Figure 5.10: Flowchart of agent interaction and trust simulation and computation
Typically, nodes such as mobile wireless sensor nodes are limited in the computation
and analysis they can carry out due to their size and power. Therefore, having every
member of the network for example, running the watchdog mechanism is unfeasible. The
approach of deploying CHs that will carry out the monitoring function is ideal for such
networks. Instead of each agent operating in a promiscuous mode, the CH is responsible
for monitoring and obtaining all information. A CH overhears all traffic to and from all
members within its cluster. Apart from reducing the computation, this approach takes
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the responsibility of monitoring from the agents and does not require agents to operate in
a promiscuous mode. From our review, RTMs lack effective mechanisms for monitoring
reputation information. They rely on the promiscuous mode of monitoring (an assumption
that is not always true in a real network). Consequently, they inherit the watchdog’s
detection weakness [DKB05]. In the process of capturing information about nodes, these
RTMs introduce additional problems such as collusion attacks. Therefore, there is a need
for an effective approach to monitoring the behaviour of nodes. This is addressed in
D3-FRT by the introduction of a monitoring function by CHs. The CH is responsible for
information gathering ; that is, the collection of data. By delegating to the CHs, agents
only need to request from the CHs about potential nodes to collaborate with before any
transactions. Therefore in D3-FRT reputation of other agents is not entirely determined
and managed by individual agents in the system, but by a group of CHs and the controller.
Agents are encouraged to collaborate with reputable agents through the incentive of
increase in RVs. Therefore, if agent A wishes to collaborate with another agent B for
example, agent B’s reputation will affect the A’s RV. Agent A requests the RV of B from
the nearest CH. The CH which stores the RV provides the current RV of the agent B from
its table. The controller obtains data about events in the domain to compute an updated
RV of each relevant agent and the simulation component determines the future RVs of
the agents, using historical data and recent events in the system. That is, at specific
time intervals, D3-FRT selects useful data from a stream of data from the system, which
is dynamically injected into a controller to compute the current RVs of all agents. The
simulation of the entire system utilises the processed data to predict the future behaviour
of members.
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Considering the computation of ratings, the model described by [MM02] gives a higher
weight to past behaviour. The authors argue that a more recent sporadic misbehaviour
should have minimal influence on an agents’ reputation, which has been built over a long
period of time. In contrast, in the approach of [BLB02, BLB05], the current behaviour of
an agent carries more weight. This is to prevent agents from obtaining a good reputation
with high RVs and subsequently misbehaving. The later approach is adopted in this
research, with a higher weight given to recent behaviour and this is described further in
Section 5.8.2.
By comparing the historical behaviour of an agent with its recent behaviour, runtime
dynamic changes in rating are incorporated in trust ratings and misbehaving agents are
detected. This is based on the assumption that the behaviour of a malicious agent is
different from expected behaviour in the domain.
5.7.1 Computing Ratings
RVs are expressed in a continuous manner rather than in a discrete manner ranging from
0 to 5, where 5 means an agent is absolutely trusted and a score of 0 means an agent
is completely not trusted. If 0 < RV < 5, then it implies that the agent is trusted to a
certain extent. The identity of each entity is used in storing its reputation information
within the system and RVs are assigned according to identities.
In the initial version of D3-FRT, each agent has certain properties that are denoted by
the tuple:
(c, a, e, θo, t) (5.2)
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That is, cluster head c trusts agent a for event e with a reputation value θo at time t.
The time is divided into time intervals 1, 2....t− 1, that is, up to the immediately previous
time stamp. After an agent identifies with the nearest CH, the agent begins to build a
reputation through its actions. The CH constantly monitors the behaviour of each agent
in its cluster and updates their RVs at intervals. Misbehaviour threshold should not be
exceeded for an agent to have an acceptable RV and allowed to participate in system
activities. For example, packet drop count should not exceed a certain threshold. If the RV
is within the acceptable range, then the requesting node forwards the packet through the
node. Else if the RV is below the expected value, the node is avoided in the transmission.
RV’s are dynamically updated by the CHs in the system as many times as an agent
interacts with other agents and at specified time intervals j. The new RV (rv) is determined
by the CH by monitoring agents as the collaborate. The value is computed using the
formula:
rv = (θh + (µ ∗ θo)) (5.3)
where µo is a weight introduced to reduce the effect of historical behaviour of agents
on their new RVs, thereby placing more emphasis on recent behaviour. To keep the
resultant value in [0...5], we consider θh, θo and µo at their maximum values in the following
inequality, i.e. 0 ≤ (θh+(µo∗θo))
δ
≤ 5. The value of the inequality is 30, making δ ≥ 6. The
value of the inequality is 0, if we consider the variables at their minimum values. Therefore,
the equation can be written as:
rv =
(θh + (µo ∗ θo))
δ
(5.4)
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One of the aims of this framework is to anticipate future RV of agents. In order to
achieve this, the historical ratings of each agent are considered with their recent behaviour.
To predict the future RV (θf ) of the agents, the aggregate historical RV (θh) at different
time intervals j = 1, 2, 3, ...t− 1 is combined with the current recent RV (θo) with respect
to time, where n is the count of the number of time stamps.
θf =
∑t−1
j=1(θh)
n
+ θo (5.5)
The property list of an agent following the prediction is given as the tuple:
(a, e, θo, θf , j) (5.6)
Which implies that agent a in event e has an recent value θo and a predicted value θf
at time j.
An aging factor a is introduced to place more emphasis on recent behaviour, which is
a value to reduce the effect of previous behaviour at the specified time intervals j.
θf = a ∗
∑
(θh)
n
θo (5.7)
In summary, in this section we introduced the initial version of the D3-FRT framework
that is capable of providing dynamic trust ratings of agents at runtime and predicting the
future behaviour. This version constitutes a first step in exploiting the DDDAS paradigm
to aid reputation and trust management.
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5.8 Improved Version of D3-FRT
In Chapter 1, we stated that a general assumption of some RTMs is that past behaviour
is an indication of future behaviour [Kol99]. This assumption might not be true with
intoxication, described in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
Therefore, we argue that using historic (or past) interactions as the only basis for
predicting the future RVs of identities in a domain is inadequate to provide a trusted
system. The extended D3-FRT develops the supposition further by not only considering
past interactions but also anticipating possible future behaviour of domain members.
Figure 5.11: High-level diagram showing the components of the framework
In this section, an extension of the original design is presented that makes predictions
of RVs with the use of historical, recent and anticipated data [OBT11]. The extended
version of the framework is depicted in Figure 5.11 and a detailed version in Figure 5.14.
Figure 5.12 [OTB11] illustrates the steps required for reputation computation, prediction
and countermeasures in D3-FRT and the following sub-sections describe the components
of the framework.
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Figure 5.12: Steps to reputation computation and prediction
5.8.1 Physical System
The physical system may be a network such as a P2P network, MANET, a network
of Wireless Sensor Nodes (WSNs) deployed at a major junction to monitor vehicular
movement or a social network, which comprises of collaborating agents and agents in
these domains can be in the form of network nodes, mobile phones, payment cards or
other tokens, each with a unique identity. Each agent in the system has attributes and
behaviours associated with it, shown in Figure 5.13, and is uniquely identifiable with its
AgentID attribute. The historical (physical system and simulation), recent and future
RVs, denoted θRh , θ
S
h , θ
R
o and θ
S
f respectively are also attributes for each agent.
The reputation of a given agent is determined by the ratings maintained by the
controller while the reputation of a given region is determined by the collective ratings of
the agents that belong to the region. The regions of trust changes (in terms of the agents
that constitute the region, the size of the region and the overall reputation of the region)
as the system evolves over time. Each agent belongs to a region of trust which may either
be of high-risk, medium-risk or low-risk depending on their RVs.
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Figure 5.13: Agent attributes and behaviours
5.8.2 Controller
The controller is assumed to secure from attacks because it is more powerful device and
can protect itself; it is considered as trustworthy. This controller however, may become
a performance bottleneck and/or a single point of failure. However, depending on the
domain of application, it is possible to have back-up controllers to provide redundancy
and scalability in the framework.
The data controller obtains stream of data and filters out the useful portion for further
processing. The raw data about an agent interaction is converted to a value. That is, each
interacting agent earns a value depending on its behaviour in the interaction. The value
obtained is added to the average θRh s for each agent in order to obtain the agent’s current
RV (θRo ) which is then stored in the database. In order to carry out these functions, the
controller has the following components an Aggregator, a Data Transformer, a Reputation
Value Calculator and a Data Repository that are described below.
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Figure 5.14: A more detailed diagram that depicts the components of the D3-FRT
5.8.2.1 Data Aggregation
Data which is a representation of the behaviour and collaboration among agents is collected
from the CHs. The requirement for data to be admitted into the controller is to meet
the specified criteria and any other data is simply discarded. To meet the criteria the
data has to be relevant. Relevant data may include data on events about agents with RVs
below the threshold and about agents that have been identified as high-risk in the system.
In addition, the output of interaction with misbehaving agents is relevant and filtered as
part of the useful data. Sudden changes in agent behaviour are also captured as relevant.
All captured relevant data are stored in the data store and Figure 5.15 depicts sample
content of the data store. Each column in the results table is a distribution of values of
one variable and each row contains the record of an agent, including its RVs, trust regions
and other attributes.
Each domain event has a unique identifier referred to as TransID. Data is filtered using
the TransID of the events and duplicate entries are automatically discarded.
108 A Predictive Framework for Modelling Reputation
Figure 5.15: A sample dataset from D3-FRT
5.8.2.2 Data Transformation
In order for a reputation system to function as it should, observations and experiences need
to be captured and represented numerically. The qualitative data about the interactions
that are captured is to be accurately represented as a quantitative value. That is, agent
behaviour is captured, quantified and measured by a representative numerical rating - RV.
Every behavioural expectation in the system has a corresponding value and the
collection of these values eventually determines an agent’s current RV, as described earlier
in this section. Agents are scored after each transaction and either earn or loose ratings.
The Algorithm 1 shows the process by which scores and regions are determined for each
transaction in D3-FRT. The value of these points is domain dependent. The act of
transacting with a suspected malicious individual, with a RV of 1 (which is below the
threshold of allowable RVs) for example, will result in a downgrade of the RV of a trusted
agent.
A set of continuous RVs is assumed in D3-FRT and each value represents a degree
of reputation as detailed in Table 5.1. This introduces flexibility into any application of
D3-FRT, because different behaviour corresponds to different levels of trust [OBT09]. The
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Algorithm 1 Scoring of agent behaviour and risk assessment
while agent collaboration = true do
for each agent ai ∈ (a1, a2, . . . , an)
return agentID
if behaviour = good then
score > 0
else if behaviour = bad then
if intox = true then
score ≤ 0
else if coll = true then
score ≤ 0
else
score = 0
end if
end if
add score to ai’s θo
return θo
compute ai’s RV
if RV ≥ 4 then
region ⇒ low
else if RV ≥ 2 and≤ 3.9 then
region ⇒ medium
else
region ⇒ high
end if
return regionID
end while
reputation degrees are similar to the value stratification idea (a form of fuzzy logic) in
the work of Marsh [Mar94]. Another advantage of having such degrees is that a rating
designated as excellent is acknowledged across the domain as excellent. Thus, we avoid
the problem of what does a trust of 0.5, or 50% mean? Is it high or low?, for example
[Mar94].
5.8.2.3 Data Repository
Agents in D3-FRT have a verifiable and persistent identity attached to their behaviour in
the system. IP is an important factor to be considered in any RTM as action and reaction
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Table 5.1: Table showing the degrees of reputation and corresponding regions of risk
Reputation Value Meaning Description Region
5 Complete trust
level
Trusted agent with an
excellent reputation
Low-risk
4 Good trust
level
Very reliable agent Low-risk
3 Average trust
level
Average value and
somewhat reliable
agent
Medium-
risk
2 Average trust
level
Average value but
questionable agent
Medium-
risk
1 Poor trust level A questionable agent High-risk
0 Complete dis-
trust level
Malicious agent with
a bad reputation
High-risk
events have to be accounted for and stored for future reference in a repository. D3-FRT
automatically attaches an identity to each agent on their entrance to the system. This
allows for easy auditing of events that occur in the system.
The repository acts as a historical data source and archive. The data transformation
function is performed and the RVs of all agents are stored on a reputation table in the
repository, with each row of the table containing the RVs uniquely identifiable agents.
These historical values of the agents that are stored as RVs and fetched from the data
repository are used as evidence in order to predict future possible values.
5.8.2.4 Computation of Reputation
Computation of reputation and trust is very difficult, as it has to be defined in a very
precise way. This is crucial to the fulfilment of the functions of any trust-based framework.
Computing reputation and/or trust in RTMs has been described as an abstract math-
ematical specification of the transformation of available information to a usable metric
[HZNR09]. In this framework, the specification is made through explicit equations that
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are discussed in this sub-section.
The RV of domain agents are dynamically updated at specified time intervals j in our
framework, where j = {0, 1, 2, ..., t− 1}. Note that t− 1 is the last time a snapshot of the
physical system was taken. Using the notation of θRh to represent the historical RV and θ
R
n
to be the newly computed RV of an agent after each interaction, we define the reputation
value θRh of an agent with time to be
θ
R(i)
h =
1
t− 1
t−1∑
j=1
(θR(j)n ) (5.8)
That is,
θ
R(i)
h =
θ
R(1)
n + θ
R(2)
n + θ
R(3)
n + ...+ θ
R(t−1)
n
c(∆t)
(5.9)
where the new RV of an agent is denoted as θRn . θ
R
h is the average of the sum of the
previous RVs up until the time t− 1. c(∆t) is the count of the computed θRn . The current
RV, derived from agents’ recent activity is denoted θRo . This is the sum of observations
captured and represented numerically for each agent. The new RV θRn of an agent at time
i is defined as
θRn =
µhθ
R(i)
h + µoθ
R(i)
o
µhµo
(5.10)
In order to determine the best range of values for the scaling factors µo and µh (which
are factors for the current and historical RVs respectively), we prove that:
θRn =
µh(θ
R(i)
h )
µhµo
+
µo(θ
R(i)
o )
µhµo
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θRn =
(θ
R(i)
h )
µo
+
(θ
R(i)
o )
µh
We can consider 1/µo as a coefficient of θh and 1/µh as that of θo. This is equivalent
to aθh + bθo where a = 1/µh and b = 1/µo. This applies even if the number of components
is greater than 2.
Now to find the coefficient to ensure that the result is below maximum reputation value
and above the minimum: 0 ≤ aθRh + bθRo ≤ max in the case of our framework, max = 5
and min = 0. In the worst-case scenario, if θRh and θ
R
o are both at a maximum value:
⇒ 0 ≤ amax+ bmax ≤ max. We have an inequality, as max > 0.
⇒ 0 ≤ a+ b ≤ 1 (5.11)
⇒ 0 ≤ 1
µo
+
1
µh
≤ 1 (5.12)
Therefore, Equation 5.10 can be rewritten as: θn = µhθ
R
h + µoθ
R
o as long as 0 ≤
1/µo + 1/µh ≤ 1. This inequality equation specifies the range for the scaling factors used.
5.8.3 Simulation
The simulation of the system and the real system both run concurrently. However, this
component of the framework works ahead in time of the system. The aim of the simulation
is to predict RV of members by using past interactions, current events and possible future
scenarios. At specific time slots, the current state of the system is obtained and adapted
to the simulation.
Dynamic data (recent behaviour) is incorporated in the simulation, which helps with
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analysis and prediction of the reputation of each agent. We are interested in modelling
the application level behaviour of the agents rather than the low level protocols involved
in a network. To this end, D3-FRT utilises Repast (which we extended) to implement its
predictive capabilities. Depending on the behavioural rules (discussed in Section 5.5.2)
incorporated into the agents in the simulation, the predicted RVs of each agent change
using probabilities of collaboration among the agents. These changes are indicators of
possible expectations in the physical system.
Data collected are the recent RVs (θRo ) that represent the current rating of an agent and
the other computed RVs. These values from the system are injected into the simulation
at the start. The simulation runs for more time steps and considers different ’what-if ’
scenarios in which an agent may be in the near future. Possible outcomes of the ’what-if ’
scenarios are simulated to anticipate possible fluctuations in agent behaviour. This is
because the behaviour of members generally in any network, domain or context is dynamic
and changes with time. The predefined scenarios that are considered in this research
are collusion: message dropping and message altering, intoxication and normal expected
behaviour.
The simulation considers the probability of misbehaviour of an agent and that of the
collaboration between the two or more agents through the predefined behavioural rules
incorporated in the simulation agents. The assumption here is that agents in the same
risk domain are more likely to collaborate. The resulting RV for an agent in each scenario
is considered and with this information, it is possible to average the ratings and obtain
the θSf of the agent. In addition, the scenarios can be given different scaling factors.
In formalising the simulation process, the following model is used:
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Figure 5.16: Model for the simulation rating process, where arrows indicate the scenarios
S that Agent A is considered
Pr(S) is the probability of a scenario S occurring, R is the rating in a particular
scenario and x is the mean value. f is the factor of importance that is chosen relative to the
probability of the occurrence of a scenario; an example is for f = high to be set to 1 and
f = default set to 0.2. These values including the probability limit depend on the domain
of application and can be determined by the model designer. The simulation stability
in Algorithm 2 indicates when the simulation closely reflects the physical system; the
simulation can be passed through iterations of learning process until the system stability
is obtained depending on the design decisions of the modeller. The results from the
simulation is then combined with recent and historical RVs in order to obtain an overall
RV by computing the future θSf . The overall RV is computed as:
RV = µhθ
R
h + µoθ
R
o + µfθ
S
f (5.13)
where µf is a scaling factor for the predicted value which can be adapted depending
on the domain requirements. The scaling factors are used to control the effect of historical
behaviour of agents on their recent activities. For example, if (µo, µh) > 0 and µo > µh,
this places more emphasis on recent behaviour as opposed to historical. µo should be
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Algorithm 2 Simulation algorithm inspired by DDDAS paradigm
start simulation
input data feed from source
while simulation state is not stable do
adjust parameters
end while
select a set {a1, a2, a3, ..., aM} of high-risk agents
for each agent A ∈ {a1, a2, a3, ..., aM}
in scenarios S ∈ {s1, s2, s3, ..., sN} generate rating R
return R
if Pr(S) ≥ limit then
f is high
else if Pr(S) < limit then
f is default
end if
compute θSf := x(R× f)
return θSf for each A
output feedback data to destination
end simulation
selected from the interval [0...1] and µh from the interval [0...min(µo, 1− µo)] based on the
preceding condition and 0 ≤ sum of factors ≤ 1. Therefore, if for example µh = 0.3 and
µo = 0.5, then µf ≤ 0.2. In selecting the initial or default values of the factors, a modeller
may run several iterations of the model in order to establish the most optimal values in
their environment.
After some specified time intervals t1, t2, ..., tn, the simulation state is observed and
compared with the actual state; this comparison is done automatically in the controller.
The framework can be self-adaptive by re-tuning and optimising the values of the scaling
factors (µh, µo, µf ), such that if there are any differences in the predicted values and the
reality, the factors can be continually adjusted to reflect reality. Each instance of the
adjustment always ensures that the condition µo > µh holds. This implies that an entity’s
most recent action has more impact on its RV than past actions.
Also, if there are any discrepancies between the predicted value and the RVs in reality,
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questions are raised and the role of the simulation is to find answers to the questions.
Assuming an agent A (in a low-risk region) collaborates with an agent B (in a high-risk
region), what happens to the RV of agent A? Will A be moved to a high-risk region?
What could make A and B collude? How will the regions evolve over time?
The output obtained from the simulation helps in identifying regions of high-risk,
medium-risk and low-risk in the domain. The grouping helps in the management of the
system to focus on critical group of agents that require more attention. This will equally
aid future security-aware decisions in the domain.
5.9 D3-FRT and Other Reputation Systems
In [MGM06] the breakdown of the functionalities of RTMs are divided into: information
gathering, scoring and ranking, and response. A RTM collects information on the trans-
actional behaviour of each agent (information gathering), scores and ranks the agents
based on expected reliability (scoring and ranking), and allows the system to take action
against malicious agents while rewarding contributors (response). Each component requires
separate system mechanisms (listed in Figure 5.17).
Figure 5.17: Breakdown of reputation system components [MGM06]
Matching these functionalities to D3-FRT’s components, the information gathering
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function is performed by the agents and CHs in the domain. Also, cooperative and
uncooperative behaviours are used to score and rank agents. The ranking of an agent
determines how other agents will want to collaborate with it. Agents receive incentives of
increase in RVs and risk levels or are punished by decrease in RV, which could eventually
result in exclusion from the system. Table 5.2 gives a comparison of the extended version of
D3-FRT with the some existing RTMs that have similar trust management functionalities
as the framework.
Table 5.2: Summary table comparing existing RTMs with key functions of D3-FRT
CORE EigenTrust CONFIDANT RFSN D3-FRT
Monitoring Watchdog
mechan-
ism
Peer recom-
mendation
Watchdog mech-
anism
Watchdog
mechan-
ism
Controller &
CHs
Simulation n/a n/a n/a n/a Simulation
of possible
future states
Dynamism Ratings
are not
constant
Periodic
iterations
to com-
pute global
ratings
Periodically up-
dated
Provides
real time
feedback
Current rat-
ings and con-
trol at spe-
cific intervals
Prediction n/a Past in-
teractions
serve as an
indication
of ratings
n/a Trust met-
ric that is
represent-
ative of
a nodes’
future
behaviour
Prediction
of ratings
using data
from histor-
ical, current
and possible
future RVs
It is worth noting from Table 5.2 that whilst RFSN (in comparison with D3-FRT and
unlike the CORE, CONFIDANT and EigenTrust) has implemented the functionalities
that we focus on in this thesis, the protocol still relies on the watchdog mechanism for
monitoring and observing domain events.
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5.10 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the two versions of D3-FRT. The framework is capable of
providing dynamic trust ratings of agents at runtime and predicting the future reputation
values through the simulation of historical and recent behaviour. The framework does not
rely on collective opinion and ratings to determine the reputation of system entities as it
has been shown that such an approach can result in collusion. Instead, the framework
predicts a potential compromise before the attack occurs so that informed decisions can
be made, which may include isolating misbehaving agents or even denying them service.
The initial version of D3-FRT constituted a first step in exploiting the DDDAS paradigm
to aid prediction in reputation management. Furthermore, the extended version of D3-FRT
does not rely on past histories alone but also on anticipated events in the domain. This
makes the framework proactive as a more representative picture of the framework is
made available through simulation. The simulation component of D3-FRT considers the
probability of an agent misbehaving and the probability of collaboration between the two
or more agents. This is done using the predefined behavioural rules incorporated in the
agents in simulation. Through a continuous learning process, knowledge converted from
captured evidence is used to predict future possible behaviour of agents. This component
improves the predictive capability of the framework and provides adequate feedback that
enables for example, the administrator to manage and control the network by making
security-aware decisions.
Chapter 6
Empirical Study
6.1 Introduction
So far this thesis has discussed reputation and trust management and related issues in
detail. In Chapter 3, relevant approaches that have contributed significantly to this area
of research and the issues they encounter were discussed. Chapter 5 introduced D3-FRT’s
approach that exploits the DDDAS paradigm primitives with an agent-based simulation
approach, to make predictions about domain members’ ratings. This chapter builds up
on the previous chapters, and investigates D3-FRT framework through empirical and
qualitative studies. As a proof of concept, a P2P network case study with file-sharing
peers is implemented and is evaluated through different scenarios.
The significance of this research lies in the fact that trust models have, in recent times
been considered for use in more critical domains such as in vehicle and traffic monitoring
[DJLZ10, GM12a]. Security in these domains is vital because attacks potentially have a
great impact on the society, and could result in loss of human life and property. D3-FRT
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is valuable enough to be adopted because of its applicability in these domains. What
is being investigated in this research is different from previous trust models particularly
because expectations are anticipated in the domain to influence predictions and decisions.
The research objectives listed below are reasonable and are achievable:
• Facilitate dynamic changes to ratings of agents as they collaborate. Provide an
immediate metric that expresses agents’ recent behaviour.
• Anticipate the future ratings of agents and provide possible RVs in the future. This
results in a proactive trust management and allowing for informed decisions to be
made by stakeholders about the domain.
The experiments in this chapter are carried out to illuminate and test the objectives
listed above. More specifically, we present results from a series of experiments to show
the effectiveness of D3-FRT in various domain conditions and scenarios. Section 6.2.1
examines the predictive capability of the framework in terms of the level of accuracy offered
while Section 6.2.2 demonstrates the error of estimate by comparing actual reputation
values with the predictions made by D3-FRT. Section 6.2.3 of this chapter illustrates the
behaviour of the framework in the presence of pair-wise with n-wise collusion attack in the
reputation system. The usefulness of the proposed framework in providing dynamism by
being proactive, and anticipating future events is tested in Section 6.2.4. The computation
of reputation values as the system evolves is tested to show the dynamic nature of the
D3-FRT framework. As stated in previous chapters, dynamism is essential to having a
reliable and trusted domain. The impact of collaboration among the domain members is
assessed and relationship between the rate of interactions and computation is evaluated.
The effect of varying network conditions on the framework’s performance is investigated
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in Section 6.2.5 and in Section 6.2.6, the need for the DDDAS components for trust
management is examined. An experimental comparison between TrustGuard trust model
and D3-FRT is explored in Section 6.2.7 and a qualitative evaluation with other models is
detailed in Section 6.3. Finally, Section 6.4 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Experimental Setup
D3-FRT has been implemented using the Microsoft.NET Framework version of Repast
modelling framework, a free and open source tool, which provides a visual mode of devel-
opment. Initially to model the framework, the point-and-click development environment
was used to generate Java classes; however, this did not provide the flexibility required to
build our model. In order to gain the higher modelling power required in this research,
Microsoft.NET C# framework version of Repast is used. Furthermore, for the purpose
of the experiments in this chapter, additional tools used are: Microsoft SQL server for
storage of captured observations in the network and MATLAB for the analysis of the data
captured.
The evaluation of D3-FRT is done using a P2P network as a test-bed as the domain is
representative of the complex interactions found in domains that require trust management
to function properly. The network consists of an interacting set (p ∈ N) of distinct peers,
that are connected to a CH, where each peer has direct and indirect links with other peers
in a cluster. N represents the entire network population.
In setting up the experiments and in order to obtain realistic results, we model the
simulation to resemble a real life P2P as much as possible. The network is modelled with
peers interacting with others using the communication mechanism found in a P2P network,
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causing peer states to change. Using the suggested local and peer-level parameters by
Schlosser et al. in [SCK02], we model the network by focusing on the content distribution
and peer behavioural parameters. We assume random interaction patterns among the
peers and the peers function independently and interact by means of message exchange.
In modelling the network, the following tasks can be performed by each peer: a) request
for files, b) respond to a request, c) transfer files and d) obtain the rating of a peer. The
CHs maintain an index of files that available on the peers within a cluster and can make
requests to other CHs. To determine the number of files shared we use the probability
distribution of Napster P2P file-sharing network [SGG02], which is 40− 60% peers sharing
5− 20% of the files.
In determining peer behavioural parameters, peers in the network remain from the
start of the simulation to the end. File requests are made randomly and sharing between
peers are not necessarily symmetric; for example, a peer A may request a file from peer
B whereas peer B might not request a file from A. All peers in a cluster are mutually
connected and peers do not abort transfers; all interactions are completed. The peers
are self-contained as they are uniquely identifiable with an AgentID and with a set of
attributes: historical, current, predicted and overall RVs as described in Chapter 5. The
peers exhibit different behaviours which include intoxication (ITX), collusion (COL), active
in file upload and download (NOR).
In designing our experiments, we injected intoxication and collusive attacks using the
Algorithms detailed in Appendix A of this thesis. It is worth noting here that, in our
experiments in this chapter, we make a real-life assumption that misbehaving peers are
always few compared to the entire network population.
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Throughout the experiments, there is an actual and predicted RV for every interac-
tion for each peer per time. The variances between actual and predicted values in the
experiments are computed using the mean squared error in Equation 6.1.
MSE[predicted; actual] = E[(predicted− actual)2] (6.1)
Error bars are displayed using 95% confidence intervals, as is standard practice. The
methods we use to compute the confidence intervals, along with analysis of variance are as
described in [Coh95]. In this section, each experiment is repeated 10 times and average
of the results is reported, unless otherwise stated. Time is measured in ticks, which is a
compression of time in our simulation.
6.2.1 D3-FRT’s Predictive Capability
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the performance of the D3-FRT, in terms of
its predictive capability in the presence of collusion and intoxication attacks.
Figure 6.1: Average reputation value prediction error
The following parameters were used throughout the simulation: N = 50 agents with
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number of CHs = 2 , each with an initial RV of 2.5. RV ranges between 0 and 5 and an
agent with a RV of 1 and below is regarded as misbehaving. The simulation total time was
1000 ticks and 30% of the agents eventually misbehaved. The predicted RV is computed
using Equation 5.13 and the following scaling factors were used: µo = 0.5, µh = 0.3 and
µf = 0.17. In the experiment, agents interact randomly as in P2P network and these
interactions are captured at every 1 tick. Figure 6.1 provides an indication of the predictive
capability of D3-FRT.
Figure 6.2: Mean magnitude of relative error per agent.
The predictive accuracy of D3-FRT is measured by comparing the agents’ RV in the
network with the predicted RVs. An average Magnitude Relative Error (MRE) [CDS86]:∣∣∣RVactual−RVpredictedRVatual ∣∣∣ is computed for all agents for the duration of the simulation averaged
over a set of randomly selected agents. Figure 6.2 shows the Mean Magnitude Relative Error
(MMRE): 1
N
∑N
i=1
∣∣∣RVactual−RVpredictedRVactual ∣∣∣ where N = 10 agents in the previous experiment
and the result ranging between 0.39 and 0.5 and the overall MMRE, averaged at ≈ 0.46.
The MMRE remained below 1.0 throughout the simulation runs. A possible explanation
for this might be that the simulation does not have any prior knowledge of the network
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initially. However as the system evolves, the simulation converges as shown in the next set
of experiments.
Consequently, given the MMRE, there is a difference between the actual and the
predicted values in D3-FRT and this might account for possible false-positives and false-
negatives in the system.
6.2.2 Error Rate in Predictions
In order to test the reliability of the framework, the error rate in predictions made is tested
using different parameters and scaling factors to compute RVs. The acceptable error rate
of D3-FRT will depend on the criticality of the application domain, and the risk appetite
in the domain. With a penalty of 0.4 and 0.5 for intoxication and collusive behaviour
respectively, and a reward of 0.5 for normal behaviour, the following default parameters
are used: µh = 0.3, µo = 0.5, µf = 0.17. Initially, several iterations of the model were
done and the observation was that these default values produced the optimal results. For
every 100-tick cycle of the simulation, N = 50 with 12% and 10% of the agents exhibiting
collusive and intoxicating behaviours and for the duration of 9000 ticks.
Figure 6.3: θr and θf , µo = 0.5 Figure 6.4: Estimation error, µo = 0.5
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the actual RVs versus the predicted values during the
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simulation. In these experiments, there is a 5.1% prediction error rate at an error threshold
of ±0.6.
In order to reduce the possibility for intoxication attacks in the experiments, µo has
to be greater than µh; reducing the effect of historical behaviour on predictions and
all reputation computations. This is because choosing a larger value for µh biases the
reputation value of an agent a to the observations currently received about a. A larger
value of µo gives heavier weight to the performance of the agent in the past. With µo set
to 0.6 and retaining the error threshold value from the previous experiments, D3-FRT
made some inaccurate predictions about agent reputation values at the rate of 15%; this
is much higher than error rate of when µo = 0.5. The graph in Figure 6.5 shows the
overall RVs of the peers compared with the predicted values. From the figure, as the
simulation progresses the actual and predicted values seem to deviate. In Figure 6.6,
from approximately 5500 ticks in the simulation, the error rate reduced considerably and
remained above the lower bound −0.6 of the threshold.
Figure 6.5: θr and θf , µo = 0.6 Figure 6.6: Estimation error, µo = 0.6
We tested the behaviour of D3-FRT when µo is the same value as µh which is 0.3 and
the results are given in the Figures 6.7 and 6.8 below. The error rate in these experiments
is 21% and Figure 6.8 shows that the errors in prediction initially fluctuated above and
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within the threshold boundary but later remained within the threshold boundary from
around 3800 and for the rest of the simulation.
Figure 6.7: θr and θf , µh = µo = 0.3 Figure 6.8: Estimation error, µh = µo = 0.3
From these, one might remark that the best value for the scaling factors are µh =
0.3, µo = 0.5 as the best results were obtained with these values and in addition reducing
the possibility of intoxication attacks.
Figure 6.9: Comparison of ratings in different values of the scaling factors for collusive
agents
Furthermore, when using quantitative data, it is possible that small differences in
individual values produce relatively large differences in the overall ratings [Mar94]. Since
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the mathematical model is defined by a series of equations, parameters, and variables,
it is subject to many sources of uncertainty including errors of measurement, absence of
information and poor or partial understanding of the driving forces and mechanisms. This
uncertainty imposes a limit on our confidence in the response or output of the model
[Cen12]. In our case, we try to gain insight on the whether our model is sensitive to the
scaling factors used in computing agent ratings. The aim of the analysis is to determine
the effect of the scaling factors on computed values.
The sensitivity analysis is performed by running different simulations of the algorithm
with modification of parameters in order to evaluate the behaviour of the algorithm. When
conducting the experiments, we run 10 simulations of the algorithm for each parameter, to
make statistically correct conclusions. We analysed 3 parameters: µh, µo, µf and 3 different
values were used for each parameter and for each iteration, µh is always greater than
µo. These parameters are important to our model because they influence the accuracy
of the model output. The simulations were carried out using the default values for the
parameters chosen (µh = 0.3, µo = 0.5 and µf = 0.17). The results from using default
values are used as a benchmark for the other values tested, because with default values
our model is optimal, as shown in the the preceding experiments of this subsection.
In Figures 6.9-6.12 we show the sensitivity of D3-FRT with respect to changes in its
input parameters based on the type of behaviour exhibited. Constant µh in the graph
legend is the trend line obtained from keeping the factor constant at its default value
whilst varying the values of the other factors and this is the case for the trend lines of
constant µo and constant µf as well (using the values in Table 6.1).
From these, it can be observed that the values of the scaling factors affect the resultant
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of ratings in different values of the scaling factors for intoxicating
agents
Parameter values for sensitivity test
Parameter 1 Parameter 2 Parameter 3
µo = 0.5
µf = 0.1 µh = 0.4
µf = 0.17 µh = 0.3
µf = 0.2 µh = 0.2
µf = 0.17
µh = 0.2 µo = 0.3
µh = 0.3 µo = 0.4
µh = 0.4 µo = 0.5
µh = 0.3
µf = 0.1 µo = 0.4
µf = 0.17 µo = 0.5
µf = 0.2 µo = 0.6
Table 6.1: Parameter list for sensitivity test
ratings. Although, the graphs show similar trend lines for the different cases, slight changes
to the input values have resulted in noticeable variations in the output. In each of the
graphs, one of the variables is kept constant at its default value while the other factors
change.
The experiments done have shown that there is a noticeable change on the behaviour of
the model depending on the values of the parameters analysed. The motivation behind the
sensitivity analysis of the D3-FRT algorithm was to identify the influence of the variability
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of ratings in different values of the scaling factors for collusive
and intoxicating agents
of the parameters of the algorithm in order to know which at which point the parameters
can improve the performance of the algorithm. The ratings obtained from running the
experiments using default values are significantly different from the other ratings. In
particular, we have proven that the use of adaptive factors in computing ratings potentially
influences the behaviour of our model.
6.2.3 Pair-Wise Collusion versus n-wise Collusion in D3-FRT
The performance of the framework in the presence of pair-wise collusion versus arbitrary
number of collusive agents is tested in this section. This is to analyse the behaviour of
D3-FRT in the presence of different numbers of collusion nodes and to assess how the
framework adapts in the presence of misbehaviour.
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Figure 6.12: Comparison of ratings in different values of the scaling factors for agents that
exhibit good behaviour
The peer selection strategy for the collusive peers is as follows:
IArr[0] = x1
IArr[1] = x2
...
IArr[n− 1] = xn
(6.2)
C is the total number of collusive agents, n is the number of intermediate agents that
are randomly selected by the model at runtime, where n ∈ C. Agents in positions
(0− (n− 1)) are passed through a random selection function that selects a pair-wise list of
sequential collusive agents or n-wise arbitrary list of collusive agents in the array positions
x[0], x[1], ..., x[n− 1]. Agents in a pair-wise collusion have direct one-hop links from each
other.
The results of the variance between current and predicted ratings in both forms of
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Figure 6.13: Current ratings
collusion scenarios are depicted in Figures 6.13 and 6.14 respectively, where ratings are
ranked along the vertical axis and the simulation time progression is represented on the
horizontal. With 40 peers collaborating in the network, we assess if the results are from
normal distributions with the same variance, against the alternative that they come from
normal distributions with different variances. Given the null hypothesis (Ho) in both cases,
the same results are produced. That is Ho : σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 where σ
2
1 and σ
2
2 are the standard
deviations of pair-wise and n-wise RVs. The graph in Figure 6.13 depicts the current
ratings of peers in the presence of pair-wise and n-wise collusion attacks while Figure 6.14
shows the predicted ratings in both forms of the attack. To test the null hypothesis, an F
test is used to analyse the variances in the ratings, where (C ≥ n ≥ 2) throughout the
experiments. According to Cohen [Coh95], for a hypothesis test the sample size used in
these experiments is no larger than that required to show a constant result (as depicted
from simulation time 2500 in Figures 6.13 and 6.14); this aided the sample size selection
for this experiment. The test on current RVs conducted resulted in a value of 0.7 and that
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of the predicted values is 0.8, where H = 1 in both instances.
Figure 6.14: Predicted ratings
The null hypothesis that the standard deviations are equal is accepted at 95% signific-
ance level and the variances are assumed equal, implying that there is a positive significant
relationship between the performance of D3-FRT in both forms of the attack. Note that
this applies in both the computation of current and predicted values. We accept the null
hypothesis that the two standard deviations are equal, and any difference is due to random
error. Following these, it can be concluded that the performance of the framework is
independent of the collusion attack agent selection, or the number of colluding agents.
6.2.4 Demonstrating the Dynamism of D3-FRT
In chapter 2, we described the dynamic nature of reputation and trust and how RTMs
have to be dynamic as well in order to effectively fulfil their functions. In this sub-section
we demonstrate D3-FRT’s dynamic property. The simulation parameters for every 100-tick
cycle of the experiment include: N = 20, with 30% and 10% of the peers exhibiting
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collusive and intoxicating behaviours respectively and throughout the simulation. Peers
are penalised with a value of 1 for misbehaviour and 0.9 reward for good behaviour and
all agents have an initial neutral RV of 2.5.
Figure 6.15: Changes in current RVs as simulation progresses
Selected representative agents’ RVs from the results obtained are illustrated in Figure
6.15. The selection is based on the behaviours exhibited by the agents that are repres-
entative of the entire population. The graph depicts a range of varying changes to the
current RVs of the agents that exhibited different behaviours throughout the simulation.
The first 100 ticks was an initialisation period, when the entire system was in the
process of evolving. ITX in Figure 6.15 shows the changes to an agent that exhibited
intoxication misbehaviour, COL depicts that of a collusive agent while the line NOR in the
chart shows the changes to the RV of a normal agent.
To evaluate the impact of collaboration, we compare the rate of change in RVs with
the number of interactions among peers. The graph in Figure 6.16 shows that in general,
as the simulation progresses and peers collaborate with each other, corresponding RVs are
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computed per peer. This implies that the framework dynamically computes new ratings
after each peer interaction.
Figure 6.16: Changes in current RVs as simulation progresses
In order to test the viability of the framework, a linear regression between observed
and predicted values is performed. Also, in consideration of allowing for more interactions
among the agents, the penalties for intoxication and collusive behaviour are updated to
0.4 and 0.5 respectively. The reward for good behaviour is 0.5 and the minimum threshold
value for RVs in the network is 0.3. For every 100-tick cycle of the simulation, N = 50
with 12% and 10% of the peers exhibiting collusive and intoxicating behaviours, for the
duration of 1500 ticks.
Using regression analysis to show the dynamic property of D3-FRT, we compare the
rate of interaction in the system with the corresponding changes to θos of the collaborating
agents. The chart in Figure 6.17 shows this comparison and a power trend-line is used
to forecast for another ≈ 300 ticks, to clearly show the progression in the system. As
collaboration occurs, there should be corresponding change to current RVs to show the
dynamic nature of D3-FRT.
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Figure 6.17: Rate of interaction versus rate of changes to RVs
In the chart, the pattern of changes to RVs as the simulation progresses is moving up
and to the right; therefore there is a positive relationship. This strongly suggests that as
collaboration increases, current RVs are dynamically computed and also increase. The
R2 value of the trend-line is ≈ 0.8, showing the reliability of the trend-line. Figure 6.17
clearly indicates that as collaboration continues in the system, so does changes to the RVs.
6.2.5 Performance in Varying Conditions
Performance is a major requirement for any reputation management system which ne-
cessitates the need to verify the performance of D3-FRT under different network sizes,
in terms of the Time-To-Detect (TTD) of misbehaviours. Experimental variations with
increasing total numbers of peers and misbehaving peers are carried out in order to test
the framework performance with respect to the provision of timely information in different
network sizes.
We evaluate the effect that network size (in terms of the total number of agents and
population of misbehaving agents) has on the performance of D3-FRT. We noted that as
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Figure 6.18: The number of misbehaving agents versus TTD
the network size increases with an increase in the number of misbehaving agents, so does
the TTD the agents; this is illustrated in Figure 6.18. With a network size of 400 agents
out of which 15% are misbehaving peers, the TTD is ≈ 90 ticks in a best-case scenario
with 1600 agents, and having 6.25% proportion of attackers, D3-FRT’s average TTD is
≈ 120 ticks. This result shows that the number of interacting agents has an impact on
performance of the D3-FRT as there was a significant positive correlation between the
network size and performance.
Furthermore, we considered the situation where the total number of misbehaving nodes
are constant at 20% of varying network sizes. The average TTD across 10 runs of the
experiment is depicted in Figure 6.19. We can see from the results that the TTD of all
misbehaving nodes in each experiment increases with the network size.
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Figure 6.19: The number of misbehaving agents versus TTD with 20% misbehaving in the
population
6.2.6 Verifying the Requirement of the Simulation and
Controller Components
This experiment is to evaluate the usefulness of the DDDAS components of D3-FRT. We
test D3-FRT in two scenarios and these are: (a) the case of where reputation computation
is based only on recent data and past interactions with no predictions from the simulation
and (b) where future behaviours are anticipated. These scenarios are depicted in Figure
6.20. The simulation parameters used in these experiments are in Table 6.2 and simulation
component which runs concurrently with the network contains a snapshot of the network
and is 20 ticks ahead.
The RV derived from peers recent activities θRo is updated every 5 ticks. The θ
R
o from the
last update replaces the value of θRh every 5 ticks. The set of past θ
R
h s is stored in a database
for records of historical RVs. With every observation k in the experiment, we compute θRo
with the equation (θRo )k
th = ((θRo )k − 1th)− α and (θRo )kth = ((θRo )k − 1th) + (α + 0.5) for
observed bad and good behaviour respectively, where α is set to 0.5. For these experiments,
the weights were kept at constant values of 0.5, 0.3 and 0.17 for µo, µh and µf respectively.
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Table 6.2: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Total simulation time (in ticks) 100
Total number of agents 100
Percentage of malicious agents 4
Default reputation values θRo , θ
R
h 2.5
Current weight µo 0.5
Historical weight µh 0.3
Prediction weight µf 0.17
The simulation component in the second experiment considered three possible what-if
scenarios (collusion, intoxication and failure to cooperate in forwarding of files) and the
corresponding RVs for each scenario were obtained. A scenario where the peer is active
and behaves as expected is also considered. The average θSf from the scenarios was used
and combined with θRo and θ
R
h (of each peer) to compute the overall RV in the second
experiment.
In the absence of prediction, the misbehaving agents colluded and sent inauthentic files
through the network at 60 ticks. With prediction, the framework detected and flagged the
peer as malicious at 40 ticks and with a downgrade of its RV immediately. Figure 6.20
shows the scenario of RVs of one of the misbehaving peers, with and without the use of
prediction. The figure shows the time gained with the use of prediction with a downgrade
of the peer’s RV immediately.
Ultimately in the experiment with prediction, the peer is isolated because its overall
RV is below the threshold for other peers to want to cooperate with the peer. This averts
the misbehaviour, unlike in the experiment without the prediction (similar to the models
that do not anticipate future behaviour by simulation), where the RV was downgraded as
a response to the attack. Figure 6.21 compares the predicted trust with actual RV for
some peers. The graph shows the changes in the value of a peer exhibiting intoxication,
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Figure 6.20: P2P file-sharing network result (with and without prediction of RVs)
an untrusted peer whose RV continues to drop and a trusted peer that is active with a
high value.
Figure 6.21: RVs of a peer and the comparison of the values in the network and simulation
Although, the simulation time for these experiments was for a 100 ticks each, it is worth
noting that the volume of data generated by the framework per tick is large enough to
justify the need for a data-driven approach. A snapshot of the sample data set generated
that shows detailed output obtained within a time frame is given in Appendix B of this
thesis.
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6.2.7 An Experimental Comparison of TrustGuard and
D3-FRT
A related protocol to D3-FRT is TrustGuard which has been discussed in detail in Chapter
3. Similar to D3-FRT, TrustGuard introduces flexibility into trust management by giving
different trust components varying weights and considers sudden changes in behaviour.
However, the models differ significantly in their approach in computing trust and in making
predictions.
The purpose of experiments in this section is to test the predictive accuracy of both
D3-FRT and the TrustGuard models. Both models are implemented using agent-based
simulation approach. Since TrustGuard assumes being built upon an overlay secure
network, the experiments are performed using the Repast C# platform simulating agents
as peers in a P2P network. For simplicity, we assume that the RVs of agents are updated
periodically within each time period T. Let successive time periods be numbered with
consecutive integers starting from zero. We call TVi the dependable reputation value of
agent n in the interval i. TVi can be viewed as a function of three parameters:
1. The feedback reports received at interval i,
2. The integral over the set of the past reputation values of agent n, and
3. The current derivative of the reputation value of agent n.
The simplified equation used for computing ratings in the TrustGuard model is given
in equation 6.3.
RV = αθo + βθh + (γ(θo − θh) ∗ (θo − θh)) (6.3)
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According to the TrustGuard’s algorithm, α = 0.1, β = 0.9 and to determine the value
of γ,
γ1 = 0.05 if θo − θh ≥ 0, then γ = γ1
γ2 = 0.2 if θo − θh < 0, then γ = γ2
(6.4)
The value of γ changes as the differences between current and historical ratings are
computed. Assigning a higher value to the scaling factor (β) of historical ratings results in
TrustGuard placing more emphasis on past events, which defeats the purpose of reducing
the possibility of intoxication. Also, in order to compute the final ratings of collaborating
agents using the TrustGuard algorithm, more recent observations were considered compared
to historical ones.
Using regression analysis, we describe the relationship between predicted and actual
values. In each case the total population of peers N = 500, having 10% exhibiting
intoxication and 15% collusive agents in 1000 ticks. Also the correlation coefficient R is
also computed to show if the predictions fit the domain events. Figures 6.22 and 6.23
show the regression analysis while comparing the predicted versus the actual ratings and
estimation error rate for each computed RV in D3-FRT while Figures 6.24 and 6.25 show
that of TrustGuard protocol.
Figure 6.22: Predicted versus actual Figure 6.23: D3-FRT’s error of estimate
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Figure 6.24: Predicted versus actual Figure 6.25: TrustGuard’s error of estimate
The correlation coefficient R is 0.99 for D3-FRT, showing that the correlation is not
perfect but is strong between the actual and predicted RVs. Also, R2 = 0.98 implies
that 98% of the total variation in the predictions of D3-FRT can be explained by the
linear relationship between actual and predicted values. The observed high value of the
coefficient of determination could be attributed to a closer relationship between actual
and predicted ratings. The other 2% of the total variation in the predictions remains
unexplained. In the experiments carried out using the TrustGuard algorithm however,
R = 0.93 and R2 = 0.86, this indicates that 86% of the total variation of TrustGuard’s
prediction can be explained by the linear relationship between actual and predicted values.
We note that while TrustGuard error remained at a constant rate, D3-FRT adapted and
the error rate reduced with time.
To show the degree of certainty of the results generated above, standard error bars
were used to plot the variance in ratings as the simulation progressed for both models.
Selected results from these experiments are illustrated further in Figure 6.26, in which
simulation progression of both models is varied along the horizontal axis of the graph,
while the variance between actual and predicted ratings are along the vertical axis.
Finding an average of errors is not meaningful here and since the variation there is in
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Figure 6.26: Mean error values with corresponding error bars
the measurement is unknown, error bars are used. The tight range above and beneath
each means shows the degree of certainty in the data values. It shows that the risk of an
incorrect conclusion in Figures 6.23 and 6.25 is minimal. From the confidence interval, it
can be seen that the variance in predictions of TrustGuard is constantly higher than that
of D-FRT.
The quick computation of current RVs is necessary for the effectiveness of any trust
management system. To show the performances in terms of the timeliness in misbehaviour
detection, we conducted experiments in the presence of colluding (20%), intoxicating (10%)
peers and kept the total population size at 20 in the network. Figures 6.27 and 6.28 show
the performances of TrustGuard and D3-FRT in the presence of collusion attack only,
while Figures 6.29 and 6.30 illustrate their performances with intoxication attacks only.
The vertical axis in Figures 6.27 - 6.30 show the observed TTD of the misbehaviour by
both models of the peers that are varied along the vertical axis. In each case, the TTD is
the time when the agent’s RV drops below 1.5, i.e. the time taken to detect the agent as
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malicious and then considered to be of high-risk in the network while AT stands for the
simulation time when the attack actually occurred.
Figure 6.27: TTD versus the time of misbeha-
viour in the presence of collusion attack only
in TrustGuard
Figure 6.28: TTD versus the time of misbeha-
viour in the presence of collusion attack only
in D3-FRT
As can be seen from the figures, TrustGuard’s results in presence of intoxication only
and collusion attack only are not significantly different. Similar results apply to D3-FRT,
although in Figure 6.28, D3-FRT has performed better than in the case of intoxication
only. Generally D3-FRT consistently provide timely reputation computations compared
to TrustGuard but both models performed better in presence of collusion only compared
to that of intoxication attack (Figures 6.29 and 6.30) only. D3-FRT suffered less from this
attack by having lower TTD values overall as can be seen from the time variation between
the vertical axis of Figures 6.29 and 6.30.
From a series of experiments, we compare the models using a more symmetric measure
with their respective average Mean Variation from Estimates (MVREs) [HCYM98]:
MVRE(RVactual, RVpredicted) = 1/N
N∑
i=1
(RVactual(i)−RVpredicted(i))/RVpredicted(i) (6.5)
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Figure 6.29: TTD versus the time of misbe-
haviour in the presence of intoxication attack
only in TrustGuard
Figure 6.30: TTD versus the time of misbe-
haviour in the presence of intoxication attack
only in D3-FRT
The goal is to initially compare the results by providing a quantitative score that
describes the degree of similarities between the actual and predicted values in both models.
In comparing the models, the MVRE of the overall and predicted ratings is computed
from the average of five test trials as shown in Table 6.3. Every trial involves using the
same simulation parameters as in the previous experiments for a period of 2000 ticks.
Table 6.3: Comparison of D3-FRT with TrustGuard using the mean variation estimate
approach
Trial Number TrustGuard D3-FRT
1 0.65 0.47
2 0.68 0.4
3 0.68 0.5
4 0.68 0.5
5 0.67 0.48
Average MVRE 0.67 0.49
The result in Table 6.3 shows that based on our implementation of the models, D3-FRT
has a MVRE of 0.49 compared to that of TrustGuard which has a higher error rate,
giving a significant difference of 0.19 between both models. This may have significant
effect on the domain’s performance. As can be seen, in the presence of collusion and
intoxication attacks, the mean variation of estimate of D3-FRT is consistently less than
that of TrustGuard.
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The results of this investigation show that D3-FRT outperforms TrustGuard in the
presence of known attacks, in varying network conditions and in making predictions about
domain events.
6.3 Qualitative Evaluation
Table 6.4 gives a qualitative and comparative analysis that is extended to include D3-FRT
from the work of Govindan and Mohapatra [GM12b], on relevant models that focus on
prediction. We analyse the models’ methodology for making predictions and the information
that influences the trust decisions. The analysis focuses on the prediction approach of
each RTM, where the context in use is the underlying principle of the functioning of the
models. The trust metric in the comparison is the method with which the observations are
captured, represented, and the reward system in the RTM. The models are also evaluated
on the basis of their advantages and limitations over others.
The prediction approach in [JT99] is based on a formal analysis of trust dynamics and
evolution from sequences of experiences among domain members. In this approach, a trust
update mathematical function is used to relate current experiences and ratings to the next
trust rating. Capra and Musolesi in [CM06] proposed the use of a basic Kalman filter based
on a set of direct observations, a prediction model is derived and used to makes predictions.
Here, new observations are fed in by means of a set of recursive mathematical equations
that can be efficiently computed in order to increase the accuracy of the prediction. The
level of confidence in the predictions is also dependent on the number and frequency
of interactions that occur. In the model, predictions about the discrepancy between a
claimed trustee’s own ratings and what the trustor’s experience will be; where the higher
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the discrepancy, the lower the RV. Similarly, in RLM [WLS12], the Kalman filter theory
is adopted for feedback aggregation, but through theoretical analysis, the robustness of
the model’s design is tested against collusion and false accusation attacks.
Table 6.4: Comparison of D3-FRT with other predictive approaches
Approach Context Metric Prediction Limitations
C. Jonker
et al [JT99]
Formal frame-
work that relies
on past histories
Trust is represen-
ted by fuzzy type
of descriptions
Accuracy can be a
achieved with large
data-sets
Performance is
dependent on
sample size
Capra and
Musolesi
[CM06]
Kalman filter
theory used
for predictions
through recurs-
ive mathematical
expressions
Trust value
range: [0...1]
Accuracy can be
achieved with the well
established Kalman
filter approach
Can be imple-
mented at the
expense of ad-
ditional complex-
ity
RLM
[WLS12]
Linear Markov
model for trust
representation
and aggregation
Continuous vari-
able bounded in
an interval
Reputation prediction
variance that serves as
a quality measure of the
reputation value com-
puted from feedbacks ag-
gregation
Relies on subject-
ive and insuffi-
cient feedbacks
D3-FRT
[OBT12]
Dynamic data-
driven approach
that captures
fluctuations
of trust and
reputation
Fuzzy-like repres-
entation and con-
tinuous real val-
ues
More accuracy can be
achieved by the adaptab-
ility of trust components
Cost of simula-
tion
From the quantitative analysis done so far in this chapter, coupled with this comparative
analysis, D3-FRT’s approach has shown to be useful in making predictions about how the
system can evolve at a future time. The approach considers trust dynamics in terms of
fluctuations and sudden changes in behaviour in drawing conclusions about the domain.
6.4 Discussions and Summary
This thesis considered, for the first time a data-driven simulation approach to reputation
management and to establish the validity and practicability of the proposed approach.
This chapter gives experimental evidence which demonstrates the usefulness of D3-FRT.
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Furthermore, the main research questions that this chapter answers are:
• How useful is the DDDAS paradigm in aiding trusted communication in reputation
management systems? To what extent will the framework support dynamism? How
dynamic is agent rating?
• How accurate is the predictive capability of D3-FRT? How reliable is the framework
as the network size grows?
Ratings are computed after each peer interaction in the network, and the newly
computed values are made available across the network for other peers that wish to
collaborate with the peer under consideration. Throughout the experiments, RV is
computed after every peer interaction in D3-FRT. This approach proactively assigns
ratings to peers as they collaborate. Therefore the framework captures the dynamic nature
of reputation and trust making it useful in critical and trust-reliant domain. In validating
our model, we have shown through the experiments in this chapter that an agents’ RV
cannot be outside of the bound [0...5]. In addition, using one or a combination of the attack
scenarios and simulation progressed, a good peer exhibiting consistently good behaviour
cannot have a RV < 4.0, and a bad agent exhibiting consistently bad behaviour cannot
have a RV > 1.0 in the model.
The estimation error rate of the D3-FRT is observed when actual ratings of domain
members are compared with the predicted values. Generally, the pass criterion for
predictions is largely dependent on the domain of application, the criticality and risk
appetite in that domain. Though there were some variances between the actual and
predicted values of the framework in the experiments, this is likely to be as a result of
the initialisation period, when the simulation does not have any prior knowledge of the
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network. However as shown in this chapter, D3-FRT has the capability to converge to
make predictions that are closer to reality. Also, varying the value of the trust components
using scaling factors have shown to have a great impact on the outcome of the predictions.
Hence, making D3-FRT adaptable will allow for better results. The factors should therefore
be chosen with care with respect to the intentions of the modeller and the application
domain. It is worth noting here that the observations may vary with respect to the
modelling approach, the time window of the observations and any other factors that may
influence the behaviour of the model.
Scalability in the experiments refers to the extent to which the network can grow
before there is degradation in performance. The scalability and reliability of D3-FRT
in different network scenarios is examined in this chapter. The framework is tested by
gradual increase of domain members and the results indicate that it is able to support
increase in the number of network agents both normal and misbehaving agents in different
network scenarios. Although the framework eventually detected all misbehaving agents in
the different scenarios, it was observed that as the network increased in size the TTD also
increased.
Adopting the DDDAS approach to trust management has shown to be useful with the
advantage of providing trust and dynamism in the domain. The network is simulated
with and without the presence of the predictive DDDAS component. By excluding this
component we were able to isolate the individual effect of prediction. The usefulness of
anticipating domain events, and making predictions was tested. In its absence, peers suc-
cessfully misbehaved (which is unlike the case with the prediction component), preventive
measures were taken. The peers RVs were downgraded before successfully carrying out an
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attack. This therefore makes D3-FRT proactive, reducing the overall negative impact of
misbehaviour in the network.
D3-FRT has shown to be useful as a result of anticipating domain events leading to
making predictions that are provided earlier than the actual network. This allows for
preventive measures to be taken against agents that have been identified to have a high
potential to misbehave. The agents are also grouped to regions depending on their RVs
and agents that have ratings below the threshold are considered as high-risk and are
excluded from the network. It is worth noting that although the predicted values are not
100% accurate, they differentiate between good agents from misbehaving ones by their
relative RV ranking.
The experimental evidence in this chapter shows not only that reputation information
encourages good behaviour and helps in the exclusion of misbehaving agents under dynamic
scenarios, but a reputation approach that allows domain members to collaborate with
trusted agents.
It can therefore be concluded that the DDDAS paradigm and its simulation primitive
coupled with agent-based modelling can consequently reduce misbehaviour in a trust-
reliant domain and the reliability of reputation management systems increases.
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Part IV
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
T.S. Eliot
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Introduction
The main goal of the work presented in this thesis is a dynamic and predictive approach to
reputation management among a network of participants who have no prior knowledge of
each other. From our aims and objectives earlier described in this thesis, the issue of trust
dynamics has been studied and a novel approach for managing trust has been proposed.
In addition to our study, the prediction of futuristic events has shown to be useful in
providing timely information about domain events. Through qualitative evaluation, the
use of a semi-distributed architecture has been justified.
More specifically, we identified the problems that arise as a result of trust dynamics
and proposed a DDDAS-inspired framework using an agent based approach to solving the
problems. The framework does not rely on only domain members for making trust decisions,
but makes predictions by anticipating possible future states of the system. We demonstrated
the effectiveness of our approach through qualitative and quantitative, simulation-based
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experiments. The framework introduces flexibility into reputation management by allowing
scaling factors for different inputs, and trust components that determine the ratings of
domain members. The success of this approach was illustrated in Chapter 6 against a range
of reputation management objectives: dynamism, performance and predictive capability.
In D3-FRT, the controller is a trusted party. This is a sensible assumption when
considering critical domains, where a form of central control is required. This includes
domains such as that in the traffic management scenario of the example in Chapter 1 or
in military networks where motes (tiny sensors) are deployed in a network to monitor
enemy intrusion. Unlike other models, this framework does not only use historical data
but also current and anticipated future events for prediction. D3-FRT logically groups
the collaborating agents into regions of trust based on their reputation and ratings in the
system. Our approach allows for placing more attention on groups of agents that pose a
higher risk in the domain.
The D3-FRT approach satisfies some of the properties desirable in reputation and trust
based system (as discussed in Section 2.3). Specifically, these properties are listed below:
• The framework provides predictions and ratings that help to distinguish members
relative to their behaviours in the system.
• The framework is robust to known forms of misbehaviour and attacks which include
intoxication and collusion, by both independent and collective misbehaving domain
members.
• Behavioural changes are captured and are reflected in the timely current reputation
computations of collaborating domain members. With the help of the DDDAS
simulation component ratings converge to reflect the true changes in behaviours.
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Also, the feedback loop allows for updates to be made to the simulation in order to
reflect reality more effectively.
• D3-FRT is potentially adaptive because of the allowance of scaling for different
components of trust, making the framework flexible to changes in domain activities.
7.2 Contributions
This thesis resulted in D3-FRT (Part III) that exploits the dynamic data-driven simulation
(Part II) paradigm for trust management and predictions. The main contributions of this
thesis are summarised here.
In this thesis, we extracted the requirements for addressing the issues of dynamics of
trust. From these requirements, a novel framework for reputation management is presented.
The framework is inspired by the DDDAS paradigm and adopts simulation, feedback and
control primitives. The framework is a reliable semi-distributed approach that allows
domain members to collaborate, and provides control. This prevents the spread of biased
information and known attacks on the system. Furthermore, a predictive methodology
using agent-based simulation approach is adopted. The approach anticipates possible
future states of the network for effective trust management. In order to make predictions,
the approach then uses historical, current and the anticipated future states with more
emphasis placed on more recent events than dated ones. Although the predictions are not
100% accurate, D3-FRT is able to differentiate good members from bad ones in most cases
by their relative ranking.
We take into consideration the dynamic nature of reputation and trust, this work
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provides the computation of current ratings of members as they collaborate with each other.
Therefore, acting as an online decision support system that provides timely information
for stakeholders to make informed decisions about the domain. As a result of the online
computation and anticipation of behaviours, the framework makes reputation and trust
management proactive in the domain it is applied. That is, it has the capability to react
quickly to changes in the behaviour of domain members.
7.3 Limitations and Future Work
This section discusses the limitations and possible future directions arising from this
thesis. The future directions identified for this work are in specific areas. D3-FRT is
purposefully generic, with the objective of being generally applicable to different domains
that possess dynamic characteristics and for critical environments that require recent and
reliable information about participants. As a result, specific technical requirements and
capabilities are not the main considerations of this thesis.
7.3.1 Improvements to the Current Framework
To accommodate adaptability, the scaling factors used in the computation of ratings can
be automatically adjusted as participants collaborate. Even though constant values have
been used, the simulation has a potential to be adaptive in a way that the feedback
gathered from the system can help in the adjustments of the factors for future rounds.
The adaptability of D3-FRT in terms of updating the scaling factors online will allow the
simulation to reflect the physical system more closely.
We considered the file sharing context of a P2P network in this thesis. However, as
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trust can be described as being context dependent (detailed in chapter 2), it will be useful
in the future to investigate the effect of multiple contexts on D3-FRT. In this case, agents
will have different RVs for different events that occur in the system depending on the
domain of application and expected action of members in the domain. A typical example
of this is in a MANET where a node can have a RV for forwarding packets and may have
another for its behaviour in route discovery. The results of this investigation will useful
for preventing another form of intoxication attack.
In addition, it will be interesting to explore ways of improving the correlation of ratings
(i.e. simulated and actual) in the future. Techniques to parameterise simulation rules for
more dynamism in the framework will also be considered. Furthermore, the validation of
computational models and simulation results is a critical issue in agent-based simulation
[TKK08]. Therefore the presented results may be sensitive to how the network and the
agents have been modelled.
In this thesis, we focused on predicting misbehaving members as misbehaving because
of the criticality of applicable domains. Redemption methodologies to cater for false-
positives in the framework will be interesting to researched on. Also, we considered only
known attacks: intoxication and collusion attacks (false praise and false accusations).
Some unknown attacks might go undetected and may constitute new threats. Future
studies should assess how the reputation system copes with previously unknown pattern of
misbehaviour, and unknown attacks in the system. The unknown attacks can be configured
by the system administrator using parameterised rules or making the reputation system
to ’self-learn’ and capture such undocumented attacks. Knowing how D3-FRT adapts
to, identifies and acts on unknown misbehaviour will be useful to better understand the
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usefulness of the DDDAS primitives for trust management.
7.3.2 Identity Persistence
The importance of IP cannot be overlooked for reputation management as it impacts the
effectiveness of the reputation system. This is because domain entities have to be uniquely
identifiable in order to avoid the issue of non-repudiation and impersonation. In the case
studied in this thesis, peers have unique identifications which might not be true in other
domains such as in a WSN.
To solve the issue of IP, some previous researches have adopted the distributed PKI
for identity persistence which requires a high computational power and other resources. A
problem with this technique is how to make public keys available to others in such a way
that its authenticity is verifiable [CBH00]. Although the distributed PKI approach has
been ineffective because of the inherent properties (limited computation, and battery and
storage capabilities) of nodes in mobile and ad-hoc networks, such as the use of private
(symmetric cryptography) and public key (asymmetric cryptography) infrastructure, it
is not totally impossible. Symmetric cryptography offers low computational overhead
but lacks scalability, however, asymmetric PKI has a better authentication technique but
with more overhead in terms of being computationally intensive. Therefore, it would be
interesting to assess the use of a less intensive approach for identity persistence, especially
for domains where members join and leave the system dynamically.
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7.3.3 Cost
In our experiments we show that the performance of D3-FRT with up to 1600 agents
in a P2P network situation. However, cost of simulation and prediction has not been
the focus of this research; it will however be useful to study the cost, and scalability
of the framework for larger systems. Future research can therefore concentrate on the
investigation of distributed simulation for trust management.
The role of back-up servers in providing fault tolerance will be assessed. There is a
need to verify the usefulness of introducing extra servers that are synchronised with the
main servers. The controller for example, can be simulated to have a downtime of a few
seconds and the ability of the back-up controller to support the network will be assessed.
The expected outcome is for the backup controller to take over the responsibility with
no obvious degradation in network performance. The controllers are then expected to
synchronise once the original controller is back online.
In critical domains, running a simulation system concurrently with the real system
is essential. However, in resource constrained environments where having a simulation
is not feasible; there is a need to slice down. The decision of how resources should be
managed will depend largely on the criticality, nature of the application domain and the
risk appetite of stakeholders coupled with the trade-off between cost and performance.
Future work can be based on the risk of having no simulation component.
The feedback between the system and the simulation adds an overhead to the use of
D3-FRT. Although the simulation component provides information to make the framework
proactive, in comparison with other models and allows for preventive measures, it can be
costly. The cost of accepting this overhead relative to the usefulness of the framework
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needs to be considered. Also, approaches to reducing the overhead is another area of
research for further work.
We do not claim that the approach presented in this thesis is the best approach but
it is a suitable one for managing reputation. The methodology given in Chapter 5 could
be extended to accommodate or reduce the communication overhead in terms of message
exchanges across the domain in order to reduce the possibility of congestion especially in
the network domain. Potentially, a future direction for this is to design an approach of
reducing the volume of data exchanged but maintains the precision and efficiency required
in a trust management system.
As reputation and trust are dynamic and vary over time, having fast convergence speed
is an area that should be explored further. This is essential because reputation aggregation
should converge fast enough to reflect the true changes of members’ behaviour [ZH07].
The trade-off of running different simulations that are working on different rules may be
considered. This can potentially lead to learning about the domain that can be beneficial
in the next cycle and may involve the use of artificial neutral networks to learn about how
the system evolves. Furthermore, it would be useful to know the outcome of reducing the
computation complexity introduced with having a simulation component.
7.3.4 Applications and Extensions
Globalisation and technological change have created a strongly coupled and interdependent
world. The place of reputation and trust management as we move into the era of Big Data,
is yet to be defined. Considering that the volume of data that could be generated from
sensor networks, social and military networks etc in the next decade can be significantly
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greater than that generated in the last 100 years, there is a need for a trusted Web,
where models can simulate, predict and turn information into useful knowledge [Con12].
The approach described in this thesis, which fits perfectly with the requirements of this
evolution, is timely and would have a place in the advancement.
A P2P network case study was used to test our approach in this thesis. It will be
useful to reflect on how the proposed approach can be useful in other domains. D3-FRT
is likely to be sensible in other domains apart from mobile or sensor network situations.
Further investigation and experimentation into possible approaches that can extend this
work is recommended. Bayesian probability is used in this research for developing rules of
collaboration among participants as it is an effective approach for arbitrary behaviours
[GBS08]. The approaches that can be considered include online learning, Data Mining,
Game Theory and fuzzy techniques. Although Game Theory has been used for trust
management, the main goal was just to obtain a nash equilibrium [Buc07] and where
cooperation is the optimal strategy for each member. A further study of reputation and
trust using fuzzy computational approach is required where both factors are not considered
as crisp attributes of members as this does not reflect their meanings [BAS09].
Group trust [Cap05] is an area of trust management that can be useful for coordinating
large number of devices in a sensor network for example. The idea can aid the reasoning
and making of trust decisions about groups of devices. In the near future, we may leverage
on the group trust approach as an extension of D3-FRT’s grouping into regions of trust
(as described in this thesis). Cloud computing can also benefit from the framework in
scenarios where auto agents that are used in Cloud computing to monitor Service Level
Agreements violations (such as latency in responding to requests) by users to ensure that
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only reputable providers are sought. The Cloud is a dynamic domain where new services
are introduced and removed randomly. It is an open environment where the number of
users joining or leaving the domain cannot be predicted. Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANETs) can also benefit from the DDDAS approach presented here. This can serve as
future approach in VANETs because such networks are critical and dynamic, making trust
management a necessary requirement. It would be beneficial to know how these extensions
can introduce more intelligence to the framework’s current approach to trust management.
7.4 Conclusion
We have presented a novel framework, D3-FRT for dynamic reputation management with
countermeasures against two vulnerabilities, namely, collusion and intoxication attacks.
D3-FRT adopts an agent-based simulation and a dynamic data-driven approach with an
adaptive potential. The framework enables the anticipation and therefore, the prediction
of domain events and ratings.
While other related approaches to that presented in this thesis do exist, specifically
those which use trusted third parties, the proposed method does not rely on biased domain
members for reputation and trust decisions. It is worth noting that the framework is
most suitable for critical domains that rely on feedback and recommendations with some
control.
The effectiveness of the framework has been demonstrated through simulation based
experiments. Following the study carried out in this research, it can be concluded that
the D3-FRT approach has the potential to efficiently and effectively guard trust-reliant
systems, making it a dependable decision support system.
7.4 Conclusion 163
As we move into Smart Cities, the Cloud and the era of Big Data, there is a need
for more sophisticated frameworks for monitoring complex interactions among a group
of anonymous participants in these evolving domains. This applicable piece of work
demonstrates the feasibility of our idea with the potential to be improved and extended.
There is therefore a future for D3-FRT because it brings solutions to the problem of trust
dynamics in such domains.
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Appendix A
Attack Modelling
A.1 Introduction
Here we present the model for attacks in a mobile sensor network deployed to monitor
traffic and vehicular movement, that was described in the example of Chapter 1. In this
section, how collusion and intoxication attacks have been implemented in this research are
described, including the attacker’s goals and capabilities.
A.1.1 Collusion
The mobile sensor nodes in the network may decide to collectively deceive the RTM by
having corrupt portions of a file and form a swarm and carry out a collusion attack. This
type of attack has been described extensively in Section 3.11.1. The nodes capture vehicular
movement around a junction and forward the captured evidence through neigbouring
nodes to a central server; where decisions are made about traffic redirections or for further
investigation about the cause of an accident. Assuming captured evidence is in form of a
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message, collusion proceeds according to Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for a simple case of collusion attack in a mobile sensor network
scenario
while node collaboration = true do
for for nodes a, b, c, d do
with message transmission a→ b→ c→ d
a(M) → b
a listens to b’s transmission
b(M) → c
b listens to c′s transmission
c(M →M#)
c(M#)→ d
b reports to a on c′s transmission as M
end for
end while
A.1.2 Intoxication
Generally, intoxication attack is deceiving the system by being cooperative for an extensive
period of time to gain the trust if others and suddenly begin to misbehave. This thereby,
makes it difficult for the reputation system to identify the misbehaving node. In the
network, a node that has achieved a ’trusted’ status by cooperating in sending accurate
reports across the network, receives a message about captured evidence from a next hop
neigbour. The node replaces the message with misleading, corrupt or malicious content
and sends it for onward journey to the server. Algorithm 4 gives the steps to a successful
intoxication attack.
A.1.3 Network Goals
The goals of the network in the example above are:
• Preserve message integrity across the network.
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm for a simple case of intoxication attack in a WSN
while node collaboration = true do
for a trusted node a in a network
with direct links with nodes (b, c)
a(M) → b, a(M) → c
a(RV ) + +
end while
a(RV ) ≥ 3 max threshold
a(M#)→ b or c
• Dynamically compute new ratings for nodes as they collaborate.
• Encourage good behaviour through a reward system of higher ratings.
• Ensure that misbehaving sensor nodes are punished or excluded.
• Minimise the spread of misleading or inaccurate message.
A.1.4 Attackers Goals and Capabilities
From all of the above, the attackers goals are:
• To broadcast corrupt messages or exchange the message with others.
• To collude with other nodes in order to flood the network with corrupt messages
and eventually result in wrong judgments from the server.
• To gain a ’trusted’ status by sending true observations and later spreading corrupt
files across the network.
• To constantly send bogus messages and flood the network with messages to deplete
the resources of other nodes
To achieve the goals listed above, a misbehaving node with a new unique identity and
authenticated to participate in network activities sends corrupt messages by generating
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bogus observations and sending to its next hop. The can alter messages received from
other nodes because it is one hop away from the nodes.
Appendix B
Dataset
This section provides a sample data-set showing the observed evidences of interactions
among agents in a time tick. Figure B.1 details the fluctuations in trust values and ratings
of agents in the domain. The definitions of tick, AgentID, ITX, COL, θh and θo in the
table have been given in Chapter 6. The table depicts the substantial amount of data
(in one tick) that can be generated from D3-FRT and saved to the database before any
analysis or processing, making our approach a fit for the data intensiveness of DDDAS.
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Figure B.1: A data set of captured evidences within a time tick from D3-FRT
